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ACCOUNTING FOR CATCH IN
INTERNATIONALLY MANAGED FISHERIES:
WHAT ROLE FOR STATE RESPONSIBILITY?
Andrew Serdy∗

I. INTRODUCTION
Despite the impressive strides made in international fisheries law in
the sixteen years since the convening of the United Nations Conference
on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks,1 the state of
most of the world’s fish stocks with which the conference was concerned
continues to show little improvement. This is not because of any
deficiency in the U.N. Fish Stocks Agreement adopted at the
Conference,2 which as of July 1, 2008 has seventy-one parties, including
the United States, the European Community and its twenty-seven
member States, Japan, Canada, Russia, Norway, Australia, New Zealand,
and South Africa, in other words most of the major players in
international fisheries. The only calls for its revision at the 2006 Review
∗ Lecturer in Law, Institute of Maritime Law, School of Law, University of
Southampton.
1. The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development called for a
further conference to be convened to pursue the effective implementation of the
provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter UNCLOS] concerning straddling and highly migratory fish
stocks. United Conference on Env’t & Dev., June 3-14, 1992, Report of the United
Conference on Environment and Development, ¶ 17.49(e) of Agenda 21 (as Annex II to
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I)). The United Nations General Assembly
formally convened the Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish
Stocks and gave it such a mandate. G.A. Res. 47/192, ¶¶ 1, 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/192
(Dec. 22, 1992).
2. Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation
and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, Aug. 4,
1995, 2167 U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_
agreements/convention_overview_fish_stocks.htm [hereinafter U.N. Fish Stocks
Agreement].
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Conference were from non-parties, and these were unconvincing.3 The
standard explanation for the persistent gap between promise and
performance has tended to be the slowness of regional fisheries
management organizations to implement the Agreement’s solutions,
despite the central role they are given by Articles 8 and 13.4 While there
is some truth to this, in part because not all members of these
commissions are parties to the Agreement, this Article argues that a
significant part of the explanation is the conspicuous neglect of an
essential legal tool in international fisheries discourse: the doctrine of
State responsibility. This branch of international law can hold delinquent
States accountable to other States for their acts and omissions contrary to
their legal obligations. One of the reasons why so many stocks have
been overfished to the point of sharply reduced productivity, or even
collapse, is that States exerting a risky level of fishing pressure on the
3. To date there has been virtually no academic analysis of the outcome of the
conference, but there is one notable exception. Yoshinobu Takei, U.N. Fish Stocks
Agreement: 2006 Review Conference 21 INT’L J. OF MARINE & COASTAL L. 551 (2006).
However, a negative attitude toward the calls for revision is displayed in a study prepared
for the Fisheries Committee of the European Parliament. EUR. PARL., Comm. On
Fisheries, Perspectives for the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement, 24-25 (2007),
available at www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/committees/studies/download.do?file=
17768. One of the critics, the Republic of Korea, id at 21, has since become a party.
Status List for the U.N. Fish Stocks Agreement, http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/
englishinternetbible/partI/chapterXXI/treaty9.asp (last visited June 12, 2008).
4. Article 8 provides that where a fisheries commission is competent to establish
conservation and management measures for particular straddling or highly migratory fish
stocks, “States fishing for the stocks on the high seas and relevant coastal States shall
give effect to their duty to cooperate by becoming members of [it], or by agreeing to
apply the conservation and management measures established by [it].” U.N. Fish Stocks
Agreement, supra note 3, art. 8(3). States having a “real interest in the fisheries
concerned” may become members of the commission, whose terms of participation “shall
not preclude such States from membership or participation; nor shall they be applied in a
manner which discriminates against any State or group of States having a real interest in
the fisheries concerned.” Id. The same Article goes on to provide that only those States
that are members of a fishery commission, or which agree to apply the conservation and
management measures it establishes, shall have access to the fishery resources to which
those measures apply. Id. art. 8(4). Where no fisheries commission or arrangement to
establish conservation and management measures for a particular straddling or highly
migratory fish stock exists, relevant coastal States and States fishing on the high seas for
such stock “shall cooperate to establish [one] or enter into other appropriate arrangements
to ensure conservation and management of such stock and shall participate in [its] work .
. . .” Id. art. 8(5). Article 13 requires States to cooperate to strengthen existing fisheries
commissions “in order to improve their effectiveness in establishing and implementing
conservation and management measures for straddling . . . and highly migratory fish
stocks.” Id. art. 13.
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stocks have not been systematically visited with any adverse legal
consequences before the point of collapse is reached, or for that matter,
after. The only consequence they have had to face has been the collapse
of the stock itself—a consequence that affects all other States with an
interest in the stock, whether they have contributed to causing the
collapse or not. In economic terms, States have been largely able to
externalize the costs of their risk-taking, leading to levels of risk in the
form of fishing pressure that are insufficiently precautionary not just
from a biological viewpoint, but also from an economic one.
Although there is no shortage of international fisheries documents in
which the expression “State responsibility” occurs, it is invariably
preceded either by “flag” or, rarely, “coastal” or “port,” and often in the
plural, indicating that something other than State responsibility in the
sense of public international law was in the drafters’ minds.5 In the sense
in which it is used in these instruments, “responsibility” could easily be
replaced by “duty,” “obligation,” or a similar term without a noticeable
change in meaning. That is, the obligations here, to the extent that they
exist, are primary and substantive, not the secondary duties associated
with State responsibility that arise when a primary obligation is
breached.
It is similarly easy to find rhetorical references in fisheries
commissions documents and elsewhere to “responsible fishing States,”
and when used in this adjectival form the meaning is even less clear.
The origin of this phrase appears to lie in the Cancún Declaration of
1992,6 where “responsible” seems to be no more than a term of general
approbation devoid of any specific meaning. Subsequently, this use has
been perpetuated by the soft-law Food and Agriculture Organization of
the United Nations (FAO) Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries.7
5. See, e.g., Treaty on Fisheries Between the Governments of Certain Pacific Island
States and the Government of the United States of America art. 4, Apr. 2, 1987, 26 I.L.M.
1048; Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and
Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas, art. III, Nov. 24, 1993, 2221
U.N.T.S. 93 [hereinafter FAO Compliance Agreement]; European Economic and Social
Committee, International Fisheries Governance: Flag State Responsibilities as a Key
Element
(Jan.
25,
2007),
http://eesc.europa.eu/activities/press/cp/docs/2007/
communique-presse-eesc-006-2007-EN.doc (showing the use of “flag” as a word
preceding the expression “State responsibility”).
6. See FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS (FAO),
Declaration of the International Conference on Responsible Fishing (1992),
http://legal.icsf.net/icsflegal/uploads/pdf/instruments/res0201.pdf.
7. FAO, Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, FAO Doc. 95/20/REV/1; U.N.
Sales No. E98.V.11 (Oct. 31, 1995), available at http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/
005/v9878e/v9878e00.htm.
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More disturbingly, there are now signs that other State responsibility
terms have been appropriated for use in a sense quite foreign to that in
which they appear in the International Law Commission (ILC) Draft
Articles on State Responsibility.8 For example, an International
Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT)
recommendation otherwise drafted in orthodox legal language, used
“counter-measures” where it bears no evident relationship to that concept
as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness of a State’s acts as set out in
Article 22.9 Countermeasures in its true meaning was raised not many
years ago by Rosemary Rayfuse,10 as a way for the high seas boarding
and inspection provisions in Part VI of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement (a
significant departure from the long-established ordinary rule codified in
Article 92, paragraph 1 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS) that on the high seas the flag State of a vessel has
exclusive jurisdiction over it) to be made opposable to non-parties to that
treaty.11 Rayfuse argues that where a State persistently breaches its
customary and, where applicable, conventional, duty to cooperate with
other States and the institutions established by them in conserving high
seas fish stocks, other States specially affected may board and inspect

8. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc.
A/56/10 (2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 Y. B. Int’l L. Comm’n, 26-30 [hereinafter ILC
Yearbook 2001 Vol. II/2].
9. International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT),
Report for Biennial Period, 2006-07 Part I (2006), at 163 (fifth preambular paragraph),
available
at
http://www.iccat.int/Documents/BienRep/REP_EN_06-07_I_1.pdf
[hereinafter ICCAT Green Book 2007/1]. Taken literally, ICCAT would be admitting
that the measures adopted in this instrument would otherwise be contrary to international
law. Not only is this not so, but, since a prior breach of obligation by the targeted State is
necessary to justify countermeasures, they would presumably be ineffective by definition
against unregulated (as opposed to illegal) fishing, even though the former is the intended
target. This, incidentally, is symptomatic of the quite separate confusion engendered by
the careless use of the phrase “IUU fishing,” where the three distinct but related
phenomena are lumped together as one, and unregulated fishing is treated as though it
were illegal; a kind of conceptual guilt by association. A leading fisheries economist
cited elsewhere herein has argued that salvation for high seas fisheries does indeed lie
only in assimilating unregulated fishing to illegal fishing, but that is an issue warranting
its own extended analysis in a future paper. See G.R. Munro, “The Management of
Shared Fish Stocks,” in Papers Presented at the Norway-FAO Expert Consultation on the
Management of Shared Fish Stocks - Bergen, Norway, 7-10 October 2002 (Rome: FAO,
2003; FAO Fisheries Report 695 (Supplement)), 2 at 19ff.
10. Rosemary Rayfuse, Countermeasures and High Seas Fisheries Enforcement,
NETH. I’NTL L. REV. 41, 53-63 (2004).
11. Id. at 57-59.
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that State’s fishing vessels on the high seas.12 This would be by way of a
proportionate response, satisfying the criteria for “resort to
countermeasures” laid down in Article 22 of the ILC’s Draft Articles as a
circumstance precluding the wrongfulness of the otherwise unlawful
interference with the flag State’s exclusive jurisdiction. Provided the
other necessary elements were present, such an argument might well
have succeeded as a defense for Canada to the merits of the action
brought against it by Spain over its actions on the high seas against the
Spanish-flagged Estai in 1995, which was dismissed by the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1998 for want of jurisdiction.13 On the other
hand, since countermeasures by their very nature tend to be ad hoc
responses to immediate exigencies, States are unlikely to adopt this
approach as a preannounced policy, as they would then be admitting in
effect their willingness to breach international obligations.
The remainder of this Article is divided as follows: Section II
considers in the abstract how certain basic State responsibility concepts
could apply to internationally managed fisheries, and highlights some of
the practical difficulties that may also have contributed to their neglect;
Section III—the bulk of the Article—is a case study of how States’
practice in accounting to each other for their catches of southern bluefin
tuna (SBT) has gradually evolved a “compliance” focus over the years
that owes little to any systematic State responsibility framework; Section
IV shows that this focus does not sufficiently discharge the member
States’ responsibility to other States potentially able to enter the fishery
in pursuance of their UNCLOS Article 116 right to fish on the high seas;
and Section V offers some concluding thoughts as to how compliance
can be reunited with State responsibility to benefit international fisheries.
II. “REAL” STATE RESPONSIBILITY APPLIED TO INTERNATIONAL
FISHERIES
Were States willing to embrace it, State responsibility could be
pressed into service to improve the management of international fisheries
on several levels. At one level, there is the question of the attributability
to States of fishing carried out by vessels of their nationality. In general,
States are not responsible for the activities of persons or vessels having
their nationality. On the other hand, the U.N. Fish Stocks Agreement
and the FAO Compliance Agreement both now provide, in very similar
terms, that parties to them must not authorize their vessels to fish for
12. Id.
13. Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada), 1998 I.C.J. 432 (Dec. 4).
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straddling and highly migratory stocks on the high seas, unless they can
effectively exercise their responsibilities in relation to these vessels.14
The State party must ensure that its vessels comply with the conservation
and management measures adopted by any fisheries commission of
which it is a member, and refrain from fishing for any stock managed by
a commission of which it is not.15 The requirement of a positive act of
licensing or authorization ensures at least some level of consciousness by
the flag State of the level of fishing pressure it exerts on the high seas. It
also engenders awareness that other States expect it to control the fishing
activities on the high seas by the vessels it flags, and that it is
internationally answerable to them on a political level—if not yet
obviously responsible on a legal one—if it fails to do so.
Could the provisions just cited be used as the basis of an argument
that high seas fishing either already is, or ought to be, an exception to the
general rule of non-attribution? Alternatively, such an exception would
not be necessary if the State’s responsibility were already engaged on the
basis of its failure to prevent an outcome for which it was not directly
responsible. This occurred recently in the context of genocide, where the
ICJ held that Serbia was not responsible for the massacre at Srebrenica,
but had failed to comply with a treaty obligation to prevent it.16 This
would not be an efficacious solution to fisheries problems, however, if
the only remedy in such circumstances is a declaration by way of
satisfaction, which is all that Bosnia and Herzegovina secured in this
case.17
Despite the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment
and the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development
providing in identical terms that States have “the responsibility to ensure
that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to
the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction,”18 a survey by Alan Boyle reveals very few instances of
14. U.N. Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 2, art. 18(2); FAO Compliance
Agreement, supra note 4, art. III(3).
15. U.N. Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 2, arts. 17(2), 18(1); FAO Compliance
Agreement, supra note 4, art. III(1)(a) and (2).
16. See Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 2007 I.C.J. 91,
¶¶ 377-450 (Feb. 26).
17. Id. ¶¶ 451-470.
18. The Stockholm Declaration is reprinted in United Nations Conference on the
Human Environment, June 5-16, 1972, Stockholm Declaration on the United Nations
Conference on the Human Environment, 5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14 (June 16, 1972).
The Rio Declaration forms Annex I to the Report of the U.N. Conference on
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compensation being sought and granted for any sort of environmental
harm.19 The single instance touching on fisheries—compensation by the
United States to Japan in the 1950s, without admission of liability, for
injury to fishermen on the high seas and contamination of fish by U.S.
atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons—did not distinguish between the
physical and economic elements of the damage suffered.20 From this,
Boyle concludes that:
[T]here is sufficient uncertainty regarding the subject, and its
utility in preference to alternative approaches, to pose serious
doubts about the concept [of State responsibility] . . . . The most
important objection to a strategy which relies on state
responsibility, in the form of an obligation for states to
compensate for harm, remains the argument that it is an
inadequate model for the enforcement of international standards
of environmental protection. Like tort law it can complement,
but does not displace, the primary need for the setting and
enforcement of adequate international standards of
environmental protection.21
Instead, Boyle advocates the use of private civil liability remedies
against those directly responsible for environmental costs, as well as the
application of the “polluter pays” principle coupled with criminal law
sanctions through prosecutions by the flag State.22 This, however, would
require relevant States to be under an obligation to allow such litigation
by injured parties in their domestic courts, but there is no sign of such a
development, at least in international fisheries law. Private civil liability
is also far better suited to compensating for single catastrophic pollution
events than for the cumulative harm of excessive fishing pressure on a

Environment and Development. United Nations Conference on Env’t & Dev., supra note
1. Principle 13 of the Rio Declaration instructs States to “develop further international
law regarding liability and compensation for adverse effects of environmental damage
caused by activities within their jurisdiction or control to areas beyond their jurisdiction;”
language very similar to Principle 22 of the Stockholm Declaration of two decades
earlier. Id.
19. Alan E. Boyle, Remedying Harm to International Common Spaces and Resources:
Compensation and Other Approaches, in HARM TO THE ENVIRONMENT: THE RIGHT TO
COMPENSATION AND THE ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES 83, 87-88 (Peter Wetterstein ed.,
1997).
20. Kathy Leigh, Liability for Damage to the Global Commons, 14 AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L
L. 129, 136 (1992).
21. Boyle, supra note 19, at 91.
22. Id. at 92, 98.
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stock that has been exerted by multiple operators. Thus, Kathy Leigh
argues that the distinction between State and civil liability can be
overstated, and that “[c]ivil liability regimes are obligations entered into
by States with respect to persons under their jurisdiction. Civil liability
can thus be one way of satisfying State liability.”23
Dinah Shelton, by contrast, is more positively disposed to invocation
of State responsibility for breaches of international environmental
obligations. While acknowledging a decline in the frequency of such
recourse, she attributes it to the rise of non-adversarial compliance
procedures, which is especially marked in the environmental sphere in
areas outside the jurisdiction of any State; such as the high seas where
breaches of obligations are “unlikely to injure another state directly or
give rise to a classic claim for reparations.”24 One possible reason for
this is that on the rare occasions when State responsibility is invoked, the
State doing so typically envisages the process primarily as a compliance
mechanism aimed at securing cessation of the non-compliance, with
remedy for past injury being less important than future compliance.
While this is understandable from the point of view of maintaining
cooperative relations among States, it does nothing to advance the
attainment of the goal of whichever treaty regime happens to be in
question. Without remedial action the fish stock will remain smaller, or
the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere higher, than
ultimately desired.25 With a view to actually achieving the management
goals that international fisheries commissions adopt, what is envisaged
below for State responsibility concerning fisheries is precisely the
complementary role to international regulation that Boyle admits. Since
the insufficiency of such regulation on its own is amply demonstrated
throughout this work, his misgivings do not appear sufficient to deter
recourse to it.
Secondly, although State responsibility is conceived as confined to
the context of a breach of international law,26 this need not be a serious
obstacle to its applicability in an international fisheries context. In the
abstract, it should not be excessively difficult for a State contemplating
invoking another State’s international responsibility to establish a breach
either of the obligations cited above, or of the more general obligation to

23. Leigh, supra note 20, at 140.
24. Dinah Shelton, Righting Wrongs: Reparations in the Articles on State
Responsibility, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 833, 834 (2002).
25. Id. at 836, 854-55.
26. The full title of the International Law Commission’s Articles on State
Responsibility indicates this. ILC Yearbook 2001 Vol. II/2, supra note 8, at 117.
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cooperate on high seas fisheries in Articles 117-119 of UNCLOS, a duty
now thought to bind all States, even non-parties, as customary
international law.27 There is, however, one potential complication,
namely, determining which States are injured by overfishing. This may
well depend on what specific obligations are owed. Article 42 of the
ILC’s 2001 Draft Articles provides that:
A State is entitled as an injured State to invoke the responsibility
of another State if the obligation breached is owed to:
(a) That State individually; or
(b) A group of States including that State, or the
international community as a whole, and the breach of the
obligation:
(i) Specially affects that State; or
(ii) Is of such a character as radically to change the position
of all the other States to which the obligation is owed with
respect to the further performance of the obligation.28
Only seldom will paragraph (a) be applicable, since the obligation of
the overfishing State to limit its catch from a given stock to some
specific figure, or to cooperate with the State seeking redress, is not
likely to be owed to the latter State individually unless these two States
are the only ones fishing that stock. It is thus necessary for a subset of
all States to be designated as “specially affected” as required by
subparagraph (b)(i), and for this to occur, some criterion will be
essential. This is because it is not evident that breach of a fishing catch
limit would, except in rare cases, be “of such a character as radically to
change the position of all the other States to which the obligation is owed
with respect to the further performance of the obligation.”29 As
explained in the ILC’s Commentary on Article 42,30 by reference to the
similar commentary accompanying its 1966 Draft Articles on the Law of

27. STUART B. KAYE, INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT 322-23 (2001). Kaye
comes to this conclusion based on the utterances made by the States in the Bering Sea
pollock fishery. Id.
28. ILC Yearbook 2001 Vol. II/2, supra note 8, at 117.
29. Id.
30. “The other States must be . . . at least individually affected in that the breach
necessarily undermines or destroys the basis for its further performance of the treaty.”
ILC Yearbook 2001 Vol. II/2, supra note 8, at 117 (emphasis added). Overfishing rarely
destroys the basis, but by definition will always undermine it in greater or lesser degree.
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Treaties31 that eventually became the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties,32 the provision was drafted with black-and-white situations like
the Partial Test Ban Treaty33 in mind. In these, there can only be
compliance or non-compliance, but no tertium quid. This is not,
however, the position where the obligation is one of adhering to a
quantified limit, as is typically the case in fisheries, but also in many
conventional arms limitation treaties where it may be possible to speak
of a continuum of compliance (e.g., where a State is limited to a certain
number of tanks, aircraft, etc., in a given area), such that if a party
marginally exceeds these numerical or spatial limits it would most
probably shift the balance of advantage for other parties in the direction
of non-compliance. This would raise the possibility that they will in turn
act non-compliantly, but by no means render it inevitable. For example,
if the non-compliance is trivial, other parties could well calculate that the
balance of political advantage lies in making public protests, rather than
taking concrete action.34
It is argued here that a profitability criterion should be applied to
identify specially affected States. That is, overfishing on the high seas in
violation of the obligations discussed above injures the economic interest
of every State that could profitably fish the stock at the biomass that
produces the maximum sustainable yield (Bmsy), or, where applicable, at
a target point established in accordance with Annex II to the U.N. Fish
Stocks Agreement. In other words, any such State ought to be a
specially affected injured State for the purposes of Article 42.
His general scepticism notwithstanding, Boyle concedes that a State
whose fishing rights on the high seas are denied, or interfered with by
pollution, could be an “injured State” for the purposes of the ILC Draft
Articles, so that there is no need to rely on dubious arguments in favor of

31. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Eighteenth
Session, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev.1, reprinted in [1966] Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n, Vol. II/2
172, 187.
32. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
[hereinafter Vienna Convention].
33. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, Outer Space and Under
Water, Aug. 5, 1963, 480 U.N.T.S. 43.
34. According to Edith Brown Weiss, States make statements disapproving of
breaches “to secure the integrity of the rule and prevent its dissolution through
unchallenged practice.” Edith Brown Weiss, Invoking State Responsibility in the TwentyFirst Century, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 798, 803 (2002). In a similar vein Shelton argues that
even where a breach of a multilateral obligation causes no harm to any State, “it may
undermine the effectiveness of the legal regime and respect for the rule of law.” Shelton,
supra note 23, at 839.
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an actio popularis to give standing to any State prepared to take action.35
Leigh agrees: “Environmental damage can also cause pure economic loss
to a State or its nationals, as in the case of decreased fish takes due to
contamination or reduction of fish stocks.”36
Closer examination of the ILC’s Commentary on its Draft Articles,
however, casts doubt on whether this conclusion, desirable though it may
be, can always be supported. It states that the term “group of States” in
subparagraph (b)(i) is intended to refer to States “which have combined
to achieve some collective purpose and which may be considered for that
purpose as making up a community of States of a functional character.”37
This would cover members of a fishery commission and, probably, those
formally cooperating with it under Article 8(3) of the U.N. Fish Stocks
Agreement,38 but not non-member States having in common only their
actual or potential economic interests in a high seas fishery. The ILC
Commentary illustrates this with the example of a breach on the high
seas of the UNCLOS Article 192 obligation to protect and preserve the
marine environment, which specially affects the beaches or coastal
fisheries of a coastal State—i.e. not the use of the high seas by other
States. Later it is explained that “[f]or a State to be considered injured, it
must be affected by the breach in a way which distinguishes it from the
generality of other States to which the obligation is owed.”39
As for subparagraph (b)(ii), the ILC seems to be wary of opening the
floodgates. It notes that, “it may not be the case that just any breach of
the obligation has the effect of undermining the performance of all the
other States involved, and it is desirable that this subparagraph be narrow
in its scope.”40 For this reason, a State is not injured by such breach
unless it “is of such a character as radically to affect the enjoyment of the
rights or the performance of the obligations of all the other States to
which the obligation is owed.”41

35. Boyle, supra note 19, at 93.
36. Leigh, supra note 20, at 143 (emphasis added). Since the loss thus formulated is
that of States already involved in the fishery, Leigh cautions that this leaves
uncompensated the loss of potential future use of the resource by other States. Id. at 144.
Such uncompensated loss would, however, be likely to be small if the profitability
criterion suggested in the previous paragraph is adopted—diminishing the extent of this
problem.
37. ILC Yearbook 2001 Vol. II/2, supra note 8, at 118-19.
38. See supra text accompanying note 3.
39. ILC Yearbook 2001 Vol. II/2, supra note 8, at 119.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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It may be thought that this is setting the bar too high. The ILC
Commentary notes that all States have the right to react individually to a
breach of this kind even though “they may all be equally affected and
none may have suffered quantifiable damage for the purposes of article
36 [concerning compensation].”42 What about the situation, however,
when, as argued here, a group of States to which no obligation to limit
catch from a stock to a given amount runs can, albeit with some technical
difficulty, nonetheless be identified as having suffered quantifiable
damage? Article 42 seems to have left a lacuna into which high seas
fisheries have fallen: the States concerned are indeed thus affected in a
way distinguishing them from the generality of other States that could
not fish the stock profitably at Bmsy, but this, it seems, is not enough to
bring them back under subparagraph (b)(i) because they are outside the
fishery commission regime, while the mere fact that other States are
entitled to react to the breach renders subparagraph (b)(ii) inapplicable.
Of course, it is desirable that States join or formally cooperate with
international fishery commissions competent for the stocks in which they
are interested. If they do not, the invidious position of being left without
the ability to invoke the responsibility of an overfishing State in which
this leaves them is a good incentive to do just that. Since what counts is
whether the affected State was a member or cooperating non-member at
the time when the damage was done, joining subsequently would be of
no use.
That said, the alternative left to States that find themselves without
effective remedy under Article 42, because they are not “specially
affected” by the breach of the obligation owed to them by the overfishing
State, is broadly satisfactory. The remedy is to rely on Article 48, which,
complementarily to Article 42, provides that:
1. Any State other than an injured State is entitled to invoke the
responsibility of another State . . . if:
(a) The obligation breached is owed to a group of States
including that State, and is established for the collective
interest of the group; or
(b) The obligation breached is owed to the international
community as a whole.
2. Any State entitled to invoke responsibility under paragraph 1
may claim from the responsible States:
[. . .]

42. Id.
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(b) performance of the obligation of reparation…in the
interest of the injured State or of the beneficiaries of
the obligation breached.43
Here, paragraph 1(a) seems to cater to those States that are members
(or cooperating non-members) of the fisheries commission, but are not
specially affected because they could not fish the stock profitably at Bmsy.
Of greater interest, however, is that paragraph 1(b) covers precisely the
opposite situation, namely that under discussion of a State unable to take
advantage of Article 42 because it has not joined the commission, but
wishing to preserve the possibility of entering the fishery at some future
point in exercise of its UNCLOS Article 116 right and therefore with an
interest in seeing the stock conserved. In this sense it is indeed a
“beneficiary” of the customary and conventional obligation to restore a
depleted stock to Bmsy (subject to the economic and environmental
factors mentioned in UNCLOS Article 119, paragraph 1(a)).44 Such a
State will, under paragraph 2 of Article 48, be able to seek that
restoration.
If such reparations are available, it should not be necessary to resort
to the second conceivable alternative, a speculative argument not relying
on a breach at all that might be mounted. Under Article 116 of
UNCLOS every State has the right for its nationals to fish on the high
seas, subject to its treaty obligations and other relevant provisions of
UNCLOS.45 Logically, accountability for the consequences of fishing on
the high seas must fall under either State responsibility or the ILC’s
incomplete work on the topic of International Liability for Injurious
Consequences Arising out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law.46
The injurious consequences in question would be economic harm caused
by vessels flagged to State A to a fishery based in State B. The latter
topic was subsequently subdivided in a way that made it clear that it was
centred on transboundary harm from inherently hazardous activities,47
but it may conceivably yield formulations of principles that do away with

43. ILC Yearbook 2001 Vol. II/2, supra note 8, at 126.
44. UNCLOS, supra note 1.
45. Id.
46. See e.g., Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-sixth
session, U.N. Doc. A/49/10, [1994] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 153 [hereinafter ILC 1994];
Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-seventh session,
U.N. Doc. A/50/10, [1995] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 84, 86 (specifically mentioning
damage to fish stocks in paragraph 377 as an instance of harm to the environment).
47. Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-ninth session
[1997] 2 Y.B. Int’l L Comm’n. 59, ¶ 168(a), U.N. Doc. A/52/10.
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the need to establish a breach of some obligation in order to hold States
accountable for their acts and omissions on the high seas.48 The
disadvantage is that it would be undesirable for fishing to be split among
both branches of the international law of compensation, with one set of
compensatory rules coming by way of State responsibility for breach of
an actual catch limit, and another less stringent set coming from liability
for injurious consequences for overfishing in the absence of a quantified
limit. Such a split may act as a disincentive to the adoption of such
limits. That minor caveat aside, it may be concluded that one way or
another, legal tools are already available to interested States to avoid a
failure of accountability posing further risk to the stocks that they wish to
see conserved.

48. This may depend on whether the principle sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas still
extends to the use of areas not under the jurisdiction of any State, notably the high seas.
Recently the principle has been argued to prohibit high seas fishing of straddling stocks
to the extent that this damages the coastal State. B. Applebaum, The Straddling Stocks
Problem: The Northwest Atlantic Situation, International Law, and Options for Coastal
State Action, in IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION THROUGH
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 282, 301 (Alfred Soons ed., 1990). Although the focus on
territory as the “tuum” and “alienum” in the leading Trail Smelter arbitration (involving
pollution of land in the United States by fumes from a smelter located on Canadian
territory), Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (1941), has tended to
obscure its wider applicability, in its origins the doctrine was seen as pertaining to rights
rather than land, as evidenced by the United States Supreme Court in relation to high seas
navigation, see Marianna Flora Case 24 U.S. 1, 42 (1825). The same reasoning could
equally be said to apply to damage to other States fishing on the high seas by virtue of
their UNCLOS Article 116 right. The high seas is expressly contemplated by the ILC as
the place where transboundary harm may be caused, ILC 1994, supra note 45, at 163, but
its work on this topic was intended to exclude “those activities which harm the so-called
global commons per se but without any harm to any other State,” id. at 164. This is
consonant with Article 3 of the Convention on Biological Diversity, by which “States
have . . . the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do
not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction.” Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S.
79. Boyle regards the conceptual distinction between this topic and State responsibility
as unsound: he believes that most of it could easily be subsumed into the latter, the small
remainder being an almost incidental codification by the ILC of the modest substantive
obligations of general international environmental law.
Alan E. Boyle, State
Responsibility and International Liability for Injurious Consequences of Acts Not
Prohibited by International Law: A Necessary Distinction?, 39 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 1, 2122 (1990). It is submitted that State responsibility is the preferable approach for
international fisheries law for the same reason, the only difference being that the
substantive obligation already has a well settled label—the duty to cooperate—but its
precise content is unclear.
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Thirdly, and arguably the most in need of development in its
application to international fisheries, is the rule on the secondary
obligation of reparation that arises as a result of the breach of a primary
rule. In the Chorźow Factory case, the Permanent Court of International
Justice laid down the standard that:
[R]eparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the
consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation
which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not
been committed. Restitution in kind, or if this is not possible,
payment of a sum corresponding to the value which a restitution
in kind would bear; the award, if need be, of damages for loss
sustained which would not be covered by restitution in kind or
payment in place of it – such are the principles which should
serve to determine the amount of compensation due for an act
contrary to international law.49
Possibly it is the extreme practical difficulty in carrying out these
prescriptions that has deterred States from applying them to breaches of
fishery catch limits, even in the case where it was squarely alleged that a
State had taken a known amount of fish in excess of what was asserted
(but denied by the respondent State) to be a binding limit. In the
Southern Bluefin Tuna dispute, Australia and New Zealand claimed that
the 3662 tonnes of that tuna reported by Japan as caught under its
experimental fishing campaigns of 1998 and 1999, in addition to its
ordinary commercial catch, were in excess of the last national allocation
set for Japan by the Commission for the Conservation of Southern
Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT) for 1997, which they said remained binding in
the absence of any agreement for subsequent years. The relief they
sought was an order for Japan to “restrict its catch in any given fishing
year to its national allocation as last agreed in the Commission, subject to
the reduction of such catch for the current year by the amount of SBT
taken by Japan in the course of its unilateral experimental fishing in
1998 and 1999.”50

49. Factory at Chorzów (Germany v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No.17, at 47 (Sept.
13).
50. Statements of Claim under Article 1 of Annex VII to UNCLOS by which
Australia and New Zealand commenced their litigation against Japan, 29 ¶ 69(2)(d),
available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ISCID/Inde.jsp (select “News Releases” from the
“Publications” menu option; then follow “May 07, 2000” hyperlink; then follow
“Statement of Claim of Australia and New Zealand” hyperlink) (emphasis added).
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In other words, rather than attempt to quantify the damage allegedly
done by Japan to the stock, the applicant States simply sought future
catch reductions equal to Japan’s 3662 tonnes of experimental catch.
By contrast, wiping out the consequences of a breach of a catch limit
would seem to entail a complex set of problematic and contestable
biological and economic calculations in order to account to other States
for their losses suffered through reduced availability of overfished
stocks. Restitution in kind, which is the primary remedy whose
feasibility must first be investigated, involves establishing both (a) what
the state of the stock would have been but for the breach, and (b) what
future catch reduction is needed to restore it to that state. With the
possible exception of minor overcatches, this cannot simply be a matter
of deducting a tonnage from future catches one or two years hence equal
to the overcatch, with an additional penalty formula applied in defined
circumstances, as has been the pattern to date.
On the one hand, a stock whose biomass is above Bmsy may not be
damaged by the overcatch at all, to the contrary, it may even enhance the
productivity of the fishery for others, while a stock whose biomass is
short of Bmsy but increasing will suffer more or less damage than the
additional catch taken, depending on how high the total allowable catch
(TAC) is. Thus, if restitution in kind would not restore the balance of
benefits among States, some manner of an account of profits would be
needed, though this may not be easily accommodated under the rubric of
“damages for loss sustained.”
On the other hand, a stock in a perilous state can be pushed over the
brink to commercial extinction by a significant overcatch. This is
possibly what happened to the South Tasman Rise orange roughy stock
in 1999 when, on the assumption that the fishery would continue, New
Zealand committed itself to “repay” 640 tonnes to the stock over the
years 2000-2006. This was a result of the large, unregulated catch by its
fleet in 1999 after it had agreed with Australia on catch limits for that
year, but before that agreement could be reduced to writing and New
Zealand’s limit could be enacted into domestic law. Yet the repayment
soon ceased to be of any practical significance because the fish
themselves could no longer be found in commercially catchable
quantities.51 In this sort of situation, restitution in kind would not be
51. Erik Jaap Molenaar, The South Tasman Rise Arrangement of 2000 and other
Initiatives on Management and Conservation of Orange Roughy, 16 INT’L J. OF MARINE
AND COASTAL L.77, at 81, 84 (2001). Molenaar’s legal history of this fishery was
updated to 2003 by the author. Andrew Serdy, Schrödinger’s TAC – Superposition of
Alternative Catch Limits from 2003 to 2006 under the South Tasman Rise Orange
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possible and a monetary figure would need to be placed on the loss
suffered by other actual and potential participants in the fishery. This is
no easy matter, but one where a range of economic data will normally be
available to guide those charged with making the calculations. None of
this, however, is an argument for not trying; the result may be imperfect
and inexact, and the respondent State will surely be entitled to the benefit
of any doubt, and to argue, if there had been previous overfishing by
other States, that the latter had contributed to their own loss and thus it
should not have to bear the full burden alone. Even so, the very fact of
being held to account may well be enough to make States’ attitude
towards the fulfilment of their obligations significantly more rigorous.
III. CASE STUDY: ACCOUNTING FOR CATCH IN THE
SOUTHERN BLUEFIN TUNA FISHERY
Although it is possible to adduce numerous examples from other
more prominent international fisheries commissions such as ICCAT52
and the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO)53—both of
which will be referred to on occasion—the way in which catches have
been accounted for in the SBT fishery best illuminates the points being
made here for several reasons. First, the CCSBT, established by the
Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna,54 is one of
the few single-species commissions and, as such, has a relatively small
number of members. Thus, questions of accounting are presented in its
reports in relatively pure form, uncluttered by considerations relating to
other fisheries managed by the same commission or collateral advantages
sought by parties without direct interest in the fishery. Second, unlike
Roughy Arrangement between Australia and New Zealand, in FAO, Deep Sea 2003:
Conference on the Governance and Management of Deep-sea Fisheries, Dec. 1-5, 2003,
Conference Reports, 494. Although this represents little more than half of the notional
overcatch had the agreed limit been in force, it is more than a year’s worth of quota, a
proportion unsurpassed in international fisheries practice, though now run close by
ICCAT’s reduction of Taiwan’s Atlantic bigeye tuna catch limit from to 16,500 tonnes to
4600 tonnes for 2006 in response to misreporting catch of around 15,000 tonnes (as
estimated by Japan) from that stock as having been taken in the Indian Ocean where it
was not subject to quota. See ICCAT, Report for Biennial Period 2004-05 Part II (2005),
Vol. I, 156, 157-59, 239 (2006) [hereinafter ICCAT Green Book 2006/1].
52. International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, May 14, 1966,
20 U.S.T. 2887, 673 U.N.T.S. 63 (creating ICCAT).
53. Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic
Fisheries, Oct. 24, 1978, 1135 U.N.T.S. 369 (creating NAFO).
54. Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, May 10, 1993; 1819
U.N.T.S. 359 [hereinafter 1993 Convention].
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the position in other commissions, the catch limitations of SBT among its
members in fact preceded the Commission’s establishment by several
years, making it possible to discern whether their behavior or practice
changed at the time when limits whose legal status was previously
unclear became undoubtedly binding. Third, the 1998-2001 dispute in
which Australia and New Zealand challenged Japan on the latter’s
experimental fishing for SBT brought to light, through the adversarial
nature of the oral and written pleadings, considerations that are usually
omitted by the consensus-seeking drafters of commission meeting
reports. Lastly, only in the CCSBT has there been (though it was
suspended before reaching any firm conclusions) anything resembling a
proper debate on the pros and cons of making national allocations of
quota tradable among its members. This has not been replicated in other
commissions, one of which has even gone so far as to rule out trading
altogether in principle, while nonetheless approving transactions ad hoc
in practice.55 Should quota trading eventually come to pass, it will
introduce further complexity into the State responsibility aspects of
accounting for catch. For example, if quota is traded mid-season from
State A to State B and is exceeded, is State B alone responsible for the
overcatch, or do A and B share responsibility for it in proportion to their
catches? Be that as it may, a trading system could be expected to bring
significant, if incidental, improvements to international fisheries
management by forcing commissions to improve their performance in
accounting for catch of the species for which they are competent.
In the first phase, from 1982 to 1993, fisheries officials from
Australia, Japan, and New Zealand met annually to discuss the SBT
fishery, their meetings preceded by meetings of scientists from the three
States. No treaty was directly applicable to the SBT fishery. The three
States had all signed UNCLOS but not ratified it.56 The 1958 Geneva

55. Andrew Serdy, Trading of Fishery Commission Quota under International Law,
21 OCEAN YEARBOOK 265 (2007) (investigating the legal permissibility of and
requirements for such a system). See also CCSBT, Quota Trading under the Convention
for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, Attachment A to CCSBT Doc. CCSBTEC/0410/16 (on file with author); CCSBT, Convention for the Conservation of Southern
Bluefin Tuna “Quota Trading”—Legal Advice, CCSBT Doc. CCSBT-EC/0410/Info01
(on file with author).
56. See Status of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?&src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXI~6&ch
apter=21&Temp=mtdsg3&lang=en (last visited Sept. 13, 2009). Australia and New
Zealand signed on Dec. 10, 1982; Japan followed on Feb. 7, 1983. Id.
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Convention on High Seas Fishing57 was inapplicable because Japan, and
New Zealand were not parties to it. Although migratory paths took part
of the SBT stock into the southern Atlantic Ocean, and thus under the
purview of ICCAT, only Japan was a member of that body. In any
event, ICCAT deferred to the three States which could adopt measures
for the entire range of the stock. Therefore the only law that bound all
three of them was customary international law, which by the end of that
phase had already become identical with Articles 64 and 116-119 of
UNCLOS, although at what precise time this occurred is neither easy to
identify nor particularly relevant. Throughout this period, therefore, the
legal status of the catch limits set at annual meetings of the three States’
fisheries officials was not evident. The commitments were recorded in
the reports of these meetings, which were more often than not left in
draft form and never finalized, let alone made public.58 These records
could not objectively be considered treaties, and none of the three ever
took any formal step, such as presenting them to their legislatures along
with other treaties, suggesting that it subjectively thought otherwise.
Could overcatch beyond such a limit be a breach of the duty of
cooperation set out in Articles 64 and 118 of UNCLOS? Such a
conclusion would not necessarily follow, and would depend in part on
whether the obligation represented by a catch limit is better characterized
as an obligation de conduite or an obligation de résultat. In these early
years, the three States appear to have treated it, perhaps surprisingly, as
the former: as long as the State had some sort of administrative system to
limit its own catch, occasional failure of that system seems to have
carried no consequences beyond embarrassment at the annual trilateral
meeting. They informed each other of their accounting regimes at these
meetings only on an ad hoc basis.59
57. Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High
Seas, April 29, 1958, 559 U.N.T.S. 285.
58. Summary documents from the first ten scientific meetings were, however,
published by Australia. BUREAU OF RURAL RESOURCES, REPORTS OF THE TRILATERAL
SCIENTIFIC DISCUSSIONS AMONG AUSTRALIA, JAPAN AND NEW ZEALAND ON SOUTHERN
BLUEFIN TUNA 1982-1991 (1992) [hereinafter TRILATERAL SCIENTIFIC REPORTS
COMPENDIUM].
59. For instance, Japan announced at the eighth SBT trilateral management meeting
that it had instituted penalties of two years in jail or a ¥500,000 fine for violation of catch
limits. Bureau of Rural Resources, Southern Bluefin Tuna Trilateral Management
Discussions Eighth Meeting, (Sept. 18-21, 1989) Summary Record, at 4 (unpublished
report, on file with author, extracted from files of the former Australian Government
Department of Primary Industries and Energy by kind permission of Mr. Geoff Williams
of the Bureau of Rural Sciences). Australia advised that stringent measures for
monitoring the catch and size composition of catches were an integral part of the
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A second or intermediate phase lasted from May 10, 1993, when the
treaty establishing the CCSBT was signed, until May 20, 1994, when it
came into force. Having signed but not ratified the treaty, the three
States had an obligation in the terms of Article 18 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties60 to refrain from acts contrary to its
object and purpose. The third phase began with the entry into force of
the 1993 Convention in May 1994, and has continued with a brief
interregnum to the present day.61
Once set, it has not inevitably been the case that catch limits have
been adhered to, despite being ostensibly binding. Perhaps surprisingly,
given that TAC and national allocations are the central management tool
with which the 1993 Convention equips the CCSBT, it provides no
means for the parties each to assure themselves that the others are
adhering to their negotiated catch limits. To this day, the CCSBT lacks a
uniform catch accounting policy, leaving it to each member to adopt its
own regime, with consequent susceptibility to manipulation to conceal
overcatch. In the early years, parties informed each other of their

Australian SBT Fishery Management Plan. Id. at 3. All SBT landed in Australia were
weighed and assessed for length, recreational fishing groups had agreed not to land SBT,
and legislation had been introduced to prohibit any landings of SBT outside the total
Australian quota. Id.
60. Vienna Convention, supra note 32, art. 18.
61. For reasons previously explained, the entry into force of UNCLOS for the last of
the three States, New Zealand, on August 18, 1996, made no change in the applicable
law. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. The entry into force of the U.N. Fish
Stocks Agreement for the last of the three—Japan—on September 6, 2006, however,
would have marked the start of a fourth phase had not the Republic of Korea, a non-party
to that Agreement, acceded to the 1993 Convention on October 17, 2001. See
Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, Status List
www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaty_list/depository/sbtuna.html (last visited July 8,
2008). A brief fourth phase did therefore begin when the Agreement entered into force
for that State on March 2, 2008, but ended on April 8, 2008, when Indonesia, a non-party
to the Agreement, acceded to the 1993 Convention. Id. The new fifth phase is in
practical terms simply a revival of the third. The CCSBT in 2001 formed an Extended
Commission to accommodate Taiwan, which joined it in 2002. See Andrew Serdy,
Bringing Taiwan into the International Fisheries Fold: The Legal Personality of a
Fishing Entity, LXXV BRIT. Y. B. OF INT’L L. 183, 185-199 (2004). Taiwan is not
eligible to become party to the U.N. Fish Stocks Agreement, but has not made known any
opposition to it and has taken advantage of the leeway it offers to associate itself with the
CCSBT and a number of other commissions. See e.g. id. at 200-215; Nien-Tsu Alfred
Hu, Fishing Entities: Their Emergence, Evolution, and Practice from Taiwan’s
Perspective, 37 OCEAN DEV. AND INT’L L. 149, 154-57.
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accounting regimes at meetings only on an ad hoc basis, continuing the
practice of the trilateral period.62
Thus, at the CCSBT’s Third Meeting, Australia explained its
specialized system of accounting for farmed fish,63 but it was Taiwan as
an observer that led the way with respect to actual catch. Since 1996, it
related, every Taiwanese vessel that caught SBT had been required to
report the weight and fishing ground to the Fisheries Department of the
Kaohsiung Municipal Government.64 At the Fourth Meeting, New
Zealand explained that vessels participating in its SBT fishery compete
for catch until the annual limit of 420 tonnes is reached.65 The Ministry
of Fisheries requires licensed fish receivers and larger vessels that freeze
their catch to submit weekly catch reports for verification.66

62. See infra subsection A, text between notes 71 and 86.
63. See infra subsection D, text between notes 131 and 136.
64. CCSBT, Report of the Third Annual Meeting (Revised), Part I, Attachment K, at
54 (1996), available at http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/meeting_reports/ccsbt_3/
report_of_ccsbt3_part1.pdf [hereinafter CCSBT3(1) Report]. This information was
subsequently updated: since 2002, each vessel fishing for SBT must be equipped with a
vessel monitoring system that provides the vessel’s location to a monitoring center by
satellite, and the length of each fish caught must be measured. In order to obtain the SBT
statistical document, daily catch, position, and discards records must be supplied in
weekly reports. CCSBT, Report of the Extended Commission of the Twelfth Annual
Meeting, 73 (2005), available at http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/meeting_reports/
ccsbt_12/report_of_ccsbt12.pdf [hereinafter CCSBT-EC4 Report].
65. CCSBT, Report of the Fourth Annual Meeting, Part I, 53 (1997), available at
http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/meeting_reports/ccsbt_4/report_of_ccsbt4_part1.pdf [hereinafter
CCSBT4(1) Report].
66. Id. See also, CCSBT, Report of the Eighth Annual Meeting, 91-92 (2001), available at
http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/meeting_reports/ccsbt_8/report_of_ccsbt8.pdf
[hereinafter
CCSBT8 Report]. In 2003, weekly reporting was required once 25% of the quota had been
taken, and daily reporting once 50% was taken, with a view to closure of the season as close as
possible to the New Zealand national allocation being reached; all SBT permit holders were
then notified that the season was closed and that it would be an offense to take SBT for the
remainder of the fishing year. CCSBT, Report of the Extended Commission of the Tenth
Annual Meeting, 77 (2003), available at http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/meeting_reports/
ccsbt_10/report_of_ccsbt10.pdf [hereinafter CCSBT-EC2 Report]. Since 2004, all operators
have been required to furnish monthly catch returns which are matched against individual quota
holdings. Financial penalties apply on a monthly basis to those who catch SBT without quota;
operators have the opportunity to reconcile their quota and catch until the end of the fishing year
(i.e. by purchase of quota, if available), after which the penalties increase. The total catch is
assessed annually and adjustment made in future years’ limits to balance the catch from the
fishery and the New Zealand national allocation. CCSBT, Report of the Extended Commission
of the Eleventh Annual Meeting, 74 (2004), available at http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/
meeting_reports/ccsbt_11/report_of_ccsbt11.pdf [hereinafter CCSBT-EC3 Report].
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At the CCSBT’s Fifth Meeting, Japan explained that the Japan
Fisheries Agency set an annual catch limit and closed seasons to protect
spawning and juvenile fish for three separate fishing areas off Tasmania,
Cape Town, and in the southern Indian Ocean. It required vessels to
report their catch and position, dispatched patrol boats, and posted
observers aboard fishing vessels. Under government supervision, the
industry itself decided the allocation of the catch among the areas, as
well as the numbers of vessels and starting dates of fishing in each.
Vessels had to report entry to and departure from the fishing ground
within three days, and report catches at intervals of ten days. They were
encouraged, though not obliged, to report catch data including biological
data such as size composition and oceanographic data daily via satellite.
On the basis of the information thus supplied, the Government calculated
the date on which the catch limit for each area would be reached, and by
regulation prohibited fishing after that date.67
Not until the Sixth Meeting of the CCSBT in 2000 did the Parties
agree to share information on their respective monitoring regimes for
catch, landings, and non-retention practice by their vessels, their use of
observer programs, licensing systems, and other relevant elements of
their compliance regimes.68 It took even longer for the CCSBT to hold a
meeting of its Compliance Committee. Despite a proposal by Japan at its
very first meeting in 1994 and the decision to establish the Committee in
1999,69 its first meeting did not take place until October 2006.70 What

67. CCSBT, Report of the Fifth Annual Meeting, Part I, 43-44 (1999), available at
www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/meeting_reports/ccsbt_5/report_of_ccsbt5_part1.pdf [hereinafter
CCSBT5(1) Report]. Five enforcement vessels spent a total of 453 vessel days on station
in the 1997 season and 589 vessel days in the 1998 seasons respectively. Id. ¶ 7(1).
Observers spent a total of 1,050 days on station spread over fifteen vessels and 704 days
over ten vessels in those respective seasons. Id. ¶ 7(2). In addition, fifteen observers
spent a total of 829 days aboard the vessels participating in experimental fishing during
the 1998 season. See id.
68. CCSBT, Report of the Sixth Annual Meeting, Part II, ¶ 25 (2000), available at
http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/meeting_reports/ccsbt_6/report_of_ccsbt6_Part2.pdf [hereinafter
CCSBT6(2) Report].
69. At the CCSBT’s First Meeting, Japan proposed the establishment of an infractions
“sub-committee.” CCSBT, Report of the First Annual Meeting, 3 (May 1994)
[hereinafter CCSBT1 Report]. The term “sub-committee” appears to be a misnomer, as
the Scientific Committee provided for in Article 9 of the 1993 Convention had not yet
been formed, and the CCSBT did not at this meeting establish any other committee to
which it would have reported. Reference is subsequently made to a future “Enforcement
and Infractions Committee” in the record of the informal meeting of April 1995. JapanAustralia-New Zealand Southern Bluefin Tuna Informal Consultations, Draft Summary
Record, at 9 (1995). No concrete steps were taken for three years until Australia and
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follows is an enumeration of the issues that could conceivably have come
to the Committee’s attention had it existed earlier. As will be apparent,
some issues were in fact considered by the CCSBT in plenary.
A. Commercial Overcatch
No Party to the 1993 Convention has had an unblemished record of
limiting its catches to its national allocation. Though views have varied
as to what legal consequences, if any, flow from it, all Parties accept that
overcatch is a breach of an international obligation made binding by
Article 8, paragraph 7 of that Convention. Accordingly, as detailed
below, a practice has developed of compensating for it by catch
reductions in future years, albeit without varying the TAC and national
allocations, or the voluntary limit in the years from 1998 to 2003 when
no such measures were agreed.71
One of the first issues tackled in the trilateral period, or first phase,
was whether the catch limits covered only targeted catch of SBT, or also
fish of the same species taken as bycatch. Although it is evident that
only the latter is a genuine discipline on the catch, since quite large
amounts of a species may be removed from the sea inadvertently,
Australia’s system of individual transferable quotas72 did not initially
New Zealand made the point that the need for the members to act quickly to establish
such a committee was underscored by the December 1996 incident when an Australian
aerial surveillance operation, conducted to investigate Japan’s claims that non-member
vessels were moving into high seas SBT fishing grounds as soon as fishing by Japanese
vessels had ceased, instead revealed at least forty Japanese vessels operating after closure
of the Japanese season in contravention of Japanese law. CCSBT, Report of the Resumed
Third Annual Meeting (Revised), 3-5 (1997), available at http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/
meeting_reports/ccsbt_3/report_of_ccsbt3_part2.pdf. Japan subsequently reported that
the incident had led to overcatch of its national allocation by 308 tonnes. Id. at 4. The
purpose of the Compliance Committee was thus to provide a vehicle for members to
pressure each other to return to compliance as soon as possible. The delay was caused by
debate between New Zealand (supported by Australia) and Japan regarding the
Committee’s terms of reference, principally, the U.N. Fish Stocks Agreement’s
provisions on collaborative compliance action, including high seas vessel inspections.
See id. at 12-13. An abortive decision to convene the Compliance Committee was also
made at the Fifth Meeting. CCSBT5(1) Report, supra note 67, at 2.
70. See CCSBT, Report of the First Meeting of the Compliance Committee (2006),
available at http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/meeting_reports/ccsbt_13/report_of_CC1.pdf.
71. Infra, text at notes 98-105.
72. See Office of Legislative Drafting and Publishing, Attorney-General’s
Department, Southern Bluefin Tuna Fishery Management Plan 1995 (as amended up to
Feb. 27, 2008), available at http://www.comlaw.gov.au/comlaw/legislation/
legislativeinstrumentcompilation1.nsf/0/E4FC3C884F1FC2B0CA2573FD00236F85/$file
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include bycatch. In reporting to the 1988 management meeting that its
fishery plan had been amended to delete provision for incidental catch,
so that all commercial catch had to be covered by quota,73 Australia
disclosed that bycatch had been around four to five tonnes per annum.74
The 1988 meeting report records one of the few instances of one
State arguing that another State should compensate it for the latter’s
excessive catch, albeit with somewhat loose use of the term
“responsibility,” as no breach of an obligation was asserted.75 Seeking to
maintain its share of the catch, Japan contended that “large catches [by
Australia] of small fish in the 1982-83 year were responsible for current
low catch levels,” and it advocated that “those who caused the decline
should take responsibility for the consequences.”76
Serious allegations of overcatch were made at the 1990 management
meeting, when Australia, noting that Japan’s methods of estimating when
its quota would be reached had the effect of allowing the fishery to
remain in operation after its 6065 tonne limit had been exceeded,
outlined concerns about “the extent to which Japanese vessels may have
under-reported SBT catch in the 1990 season.”77 Japan’s explanation as
understood by the Australian rapporteur was that it:
estimates the seasons [sic] catch by extrapolating from CPUE of
the previous two years to get an estimated CPUE for the current
season and uses this to calculate the expected date upon which

/SthBluefinTunaFishMgmentPlan1995.pdf (continuing the system of individual
transferable quotas originally established in 1984). The Management Plan has the status
of delegated legislation made pursuant to the Fisheries Management Act 1991 (Austl.).
73. Southern Bluefin Tuna Trilateral Management Discussions, Seventh Round, at 2
(unpublished, copy held by author extracted from DPIE files).
74. Note that the small amounts involved would not have caused Australia actually to
exceed its catch limits. Id. at 8.
75. See id at 14.
76. Id. at 14. No doubt part of the reason why Australia and New Zealand did not
find this persuasive was that Japan simultaneously claimed credit for its past catches as
an historic “contribution” to the fishery. Id. at 9. The claim is not, however, entirely
nonsensical. In the early years of a fishery, when the biomass is still well above Bmsy,
large catches serve to reduce that biomass towards Bmsy, thus enhancing the stock’s
productivity. The risk of course is that continuing large catches overshoot and drive the
stock below Bmsy, at which point they begin to damage the fishery.
77. P. Enright, Draft Summary Record Trilateral Management Meeting for SBT, at 21
(1990) (unpublished, copy held by author extracted from DPIE files) [hereinafter Draft
1990 Summary Record].
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the quota would be reached. This method gives a conservative
date for closure of the fishery when the CPUE is decreasing.78
Yet, while the CPUE had remained stable overall in recent years, it
had “risen dramatically off Tasmania over the last two years.” In these
circumstances, Japan noted, “it was easy to catch over quota, and this
was not at all unusual when the factors operating in this fishery were
considered.”79
New Zealand did not immediately accept this as a sufficient excuse:
New Zealand is of the view that all parties should ensure that
national allocations are strictly adhered to, and that to this end
monitoring and surveillance activities should be strengthened.
New Zealand would expect any party that had over-caught its
allocation to take responsible voluntary action to deal with the
situation.80
Australia was similarly unimpressed, stating that it did not “regard it
as acceptable for Japanese industry to expect that it can blatantly flout
the agreements made to save the fishery from extinction, and adhered to
at great cost by Australia, without making some adjustment to
compensate for the overfishing which has taken place.”81
In response, Japan appeared to deny any obligation to make such a
compensatory adjustment. It accepted that more precise methods of
catch management were desirable, but argued that “the punitive measures
proposed go too far . . . . Last year Australia allocated quota to
fishermen before agreement on the quota was reached, but Japan never
demanded punitive measures. If Australia insists on punitive measures
for Japan, Japan may insist upon punitive measures for Australia.”82

78. Id. CPUE stands for “catch per unit effort,” which is frequently used as a
surrogate measure of fish abundance, although it is not necessarily directly proportional
to it. The Japanese longline fishery expresses its CPUE as the number of SBT caught per
thousand hooks set. A. CATON, K. MCLOUGHLIN & M. J. WILLIAMS, SOUTHERN BLUEFIN
TUNA: SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND TO THE DEBATE 17 (1990).
79. Draft 1990 Summary Record, supra note 77, at 9, 21.
80. New Zealand Statement for Plenary Session of Ninth Southern Bluefin Tuna
Management Talks, at 4 (1990) (unpublished, copy on file with author extracted from
DPIE files).
81. Southern Bluefin Tuna Trilateral negotiations – Australian Statement to Plenary
Session, at 2 (1990) (unpublished, copy on file with author extracted from DPIE files).
82. Draft 1990 Summary Record, supra note 77, at 30. Japan also stated that
“[Australia’s action in 1989] allowing fishing to commence before the end of talks was
jumping the gun. This sort of action will damage the trilateral cooperative framework.”
Draft Transcript of Japanese Opening Statement, at 1 (Sept. 25, 1990) (unpublished, copy
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The following year, Japan reported that it had restricted the number
of vessels and set seasons for each fishing ground.83 It was expecting to
have filled its quota by September 30, and would therefore close the
season on that date.84 New Zealand responded by noting “the difficulties
of monitoring the catch of vessels on the high seas in real-time, but
hoped that Japan had been able to establish a better system.”85 Japan’s
reply was that “while having difficulty in monitoring 200 SBT fishing
boats, Japan was implementing a new monitoring and enforcement
system, including a new radio reporting system, together with restrictions
on vessel numbers and length of season, and random inspections at time
of unloading.”86
The explanation for New Zealand’s milder attitude may be that in
1990, New Zealand had itself exceeded its quota because of
unexpectedly good fishing conditions:
New Zealand regretted the over-catch in 1990, explaining that it
was due to a number of factors: it was difficult to monitor a
small quota in real-time with a large number of vessels over a
short time frame, and fishing conditions were particularly good
that year. As a result of the over-catch, action was taken to
ensure more accurate monitoring of catches as they occur. It is
now possible to close the fishery as soon as the limit is reached.
Fishermen who continue to fish after this are liable to a $5000
fine.87

held by author extracted from DPIE files). It may be speculated that, had the 1990
Summary Record ever been finalized, Japan on reflection would have asked for its
surprisingly incautious statement to be omitted, for it presupposes that Australia had
thereby breached a rule that there must be no fishing before quotas are agreed upon. If
there were such a rule, however, this would have allowed Australia, by withholding
agreement, to impose in that or a future year the very moratorium it had without success
advocated in 1989. See THE HON R.J.L. HAWKE AC, OUR COUNTRY, OUR FUTURE:
STATEMENT ON THE ENVIRONMENT 25 (1989).
83. Draft Summary Record Trilateral Management Meeting for SBT, at 1 (1991)
(unpublished, copy on file with author extracted from DPIE files).
84. Id. at 1-2.
85. Id. at 2.
86. Id.
87. Id. Japan commented that “compared to New Zealand’s small catch limit, the
level of overcatch was significant.” Id. at 1. New Zealand’s catch of 529 tonnes in 1990
was 109 tonnes above its 420-tonne quota. See CCSBT, Report of the Extended Scientific
Committee for the Tenth Meeting of the Scientific Committee, Attachment 4 (2005),
available at www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/meeting_reports/ccsbt_12/report_of_SC10.pdf
[hereinafter CCSBT-ESC4 Report]. While it made no mention of a compensating
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Japan’s problem, however, remained unresolved. At the 1992
management meeting, Australia and New Zealand expressed “serious
concern” over three consecutive years of catch by the Japanese longline
fleet in excess of national allocation,88 although the report contains no
mention of a compensating adjustment to future catch limits.
Only one incident of note occurred in the second phase, which
differed from the previous examples, all of unplanned overcatch. A
controversy erupted when Australia proposed to catch in the current year
one hundred tonnes of the next year’s quota, in order to alleviate a
specific problem faced by its longliners operating off New South
Wales.89 At the management meeting later that year, New Zealand said
that Australia’s action “threatened the integrity of the trilateral
management process.”90 Acknowledging New Zealand’s concerns,
Australia confirmed that it would fully apply its “stringent quota
provisions” to the quota brought forward and make a compensatory
hundred-tonne reduction in the 1993-94 quota year.91 Australia noted
that it had never exceeded its quota and that it hoped that all parties
would abide by their quota levels and institute effective measures to
prevent overcatch in the future.92 Japan did not oppose the Australian
action on the basis that it was a “one-off decision taken to address
specific difficult domestic circumstances.”93
adjustment for 1991, the catch in that year was so low (164 tonnes, id.) that tonne-fortonne compensation was more than achieved in fact.
88. Southern Bluefin Tuna Trilateral Management Discussions, at 5 (1992)
(unpublished, copy on file with author extracted from DPIE files).
89. According to a press report, the New Zealand High Commission confirmed that
the New Zealand Minister of Fisheries, Mr. Kidd, had written on this matter to his
Australian counterpart, Mr. Lee, but declined to give details. David Mussared, NZ
protest letter to Australian Fisheries, CANBERRA TIMES, Sept. 10, 1993, at 13.
90. Southern Bluefin Tuna Trilateral Management Discussions—First Session—Draft
Summary Record, at 6 (1993) (unpublished, copy on file with author extracted from
DPIE files).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. See also Southern Bluefin Tuna Trilateral Management Discussions, at 8
(1993) (unpublished, copy on file with author extracted from DPIE files). Australia’s
willingness to take a 100-tonne reduction, even if its excess catch was less than that, may
be contrasted with Japan’s (uncontested) claim in 2001 that, based on its actual
commercial catch of 5354 tonnes, it had forgone 711 tonnes (rather than the 700 implied
by the calculation below) under the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
(ITLOS) provisional measure requiring it to limit the sum of its total catches (commercial
and experimental) in 1999 and 2000 to 12,130 tonnes. See Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases
(N.Z. v. Japan, Austl. v. Japan), Order of 27 August 1999: Request for Provisional
Measures, 39 I.L.M. 1624 (Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea 1999), ¶ 90.1(c) and (d). This was
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In all likelihood, Japan either felt that, given its own history of overcatch, it was in no position to object to Australia’s request, or it was
aware that this history would likely continue, as at the CCSBT’s
inaugural meeting a few months later it reported overcatch of 250 tonnes
in 1993.94 The 1993 Convention does contain a formal quota-setting
mechanism, but, since it would need to be activated at the first meeting,
it could not apply until the fishing year after its entry into force.95 The
objective of the 1993 Convention is “to ensure, through appropriate
management, the conservation and optimum utilisation” of SBT.96
Advancing one hundred tonnes of catch, or less than 2% of Australia’s
national allocation, by a year might make the attainment of these goals
marginally more difficult,97 but the better view is that it is not contrary to
them. The fact that Australia took care to consult its trilateral partners
before acting leads to the conclusion that, despite their differing
reactions, Australia would in all likelihood have seen off any legal
challenge to its actions, although the possibility of its success cannot be
entirely dismissed.
Japan’s attitude was the first to show evident change in the third
phase. Its reaction to the spotting of the forty Japanese fishing vessels by
Australian reconnaissance aircraft in December 1996, leading to Japan’s
total catch being recalculated at 6373 tonnes, was to debit the 308
tonnes’ excess against the Japanese national allocation for the 1997
fishing year, as noted above.98

even though Japan had opted to set itself a catch limit of 5365 tonnes for the relevant
fishing year, seven hundred tonnes below its most recent national allocation from the
CCSBT, as its first installment towards compliance with the ITLOS Order.
94. CCSBT1 Report, supra note 69, at 3.
95. 1993 Convention, supra note 53, art. 8.
96. Id. art. 3.
97. Repayment by Australia of this small amount to the stock within one year would
not necessarily leave the stock in exactly the same position as if it had adhered to its
catch limit (marginal added catch when a fish stock is depleted risks causing greater loss
to the stock than the amount of the additional catch). See the eighteenth criticism of
Japan’s experimental fishing program by Dr. Serge Garcia, a senior FAO fisheries
official, cited to ITLOS by counsel for Australia, Professor Crawford, as evidence for the
inadequacy of Japan’s offer to pay back to the stock its experimental catch if it could be
shown to have damaged it. Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (N.Z. v. Japan; Austl. v. Japan)
ITLOS/PV.99/21/Rev.2 (Aug. 18, 1999), available at http://www.itlos.org/
case_documents/2001/document_en_140.pdf, at 24. On the other hand, this low level of
tonnage and short timeframe mean that the dismal phenomenon of borrowings requiring
much larger repayments than the amount borrowed in order to counteract their effect on
the stock (see infra note 240 and accompanying text) could probably have been avoided.
98. See supra text accompanying note 68; CCSBT4(1), supra note 65, at ¶¶ 1(2), 2.
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This informal self-policing system continued until the major crisis of
2006, when Japan was shown by market data to have been significantly
overcatching its national allocation for many years, leading to a cut of
3065 tonnes per annum for five years thereafter.99 Even then, the
“nominal catch” remains at 6065 tonnes, while it is the “allocated catch”
that falls to 3000 tonnes. This is likely to be because, under the 1993
Convention, 70% of the CCSBT’s costs are divided in proportion to the
parties’ “nominal catches.”100 Japan for many years had been bearing a
share lower than its actual catch would have warranted if authorized in
advance, and the unchanged nominal catch allows other parties to recoup
some of their contributions. Note, though, that compensation based on a
standard recalculation should be relatively easy to achieve once Japan’s
actual catch for the years in question is determined. What is not clear is
whether there is any appetite among the parties to do this.
Before then, the CCSBT had never itself had to reduce a member’s
national allocation to compensate for past overcatch.
National
allocations were left unchanged on the understanding that an amount
corresponding to past overcatch would not be used. The same system
continued even in the absence of TACs in 1998-2003, applied to the
members’ voluntary quotas, though in recent years the pattern has been
for overcatch in one year to be paid back not in the immediately
following year, but in the year after that.101 A possible explanation for
this lag is that, by the time the catch figures for a year are compiled, the
limit for the next year will have already been set, and there may be
domestic administrative law reasons why a catch limit may not be
reduced mid-season. Even if not, there may be a political reluctance to
do so.102
99. CCSBT, Report of the Extended Commission of the Thirteenth Annual Meeting, ¶
60, at 13 (2006), available at http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/meeting_reports/ccsbt_13/
report_of_CCSBT13.pdf [hereinafter CCSBT-EC5 Report].
100. See 1993 Convention, supra note 54, art. 11(2)(b).
101. This collective nonchalance towards prompt offsetting of the overcatch
necessitated by the depleted state of the stock, see supra note 80, seems rather lax by
comparison with the stringent standard set in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the 2000 (second)
Arrangement between the Government of Australia and the Government of New Zealand
on the Conservation and Management of Orange Roughy on the South Tasman Rise, see
Molenaar, supra note 51, at 120-21. The latter bespeaks a more serious determination to
prevent overcatch and, it may be thought, should be preferred on that ground alone.
102. Evidenced by the rule introduced by ICCAT in 1991 that “if the catch of [a
relevant State] exceeds its annual or biannual scientific monitoring quota, then in the
biannual period or year following reporting of that catch to [the Commission], that [State]
will reduce its catch to compensate in total for that overage.” ICCAT, Report for Biennial
Period 1990-91 Part II (1991), at 67 (1992), available at http://www.iccat.int/
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Thus, Japan began the 2003 season with a catch limit reduced to
5839 tonnes, reflecting a catch in the 2001 season 226 tonnes over its
voluntary limit, but not a further 127-tonne overcatch in 2002,103 which
was instead repaid in 2004.104 An exception is New Zealand, where
fishing is temporally concentrated into a short enough period for the
reduction to be made in the immediately following season. For instance,

Documents/BienRep/REP_EN_90-91_II.pdf (emphasis added). A two-year rule was
established for this reason in the “Supplemental Recommendation by ICCAT Regarding
Compliance in the Bluefin Tuna and Atlantic Swordfish Fisheries,” ICCAT, Report for
Biennial Period 1998-99 Part I (1998), Vol. I, 76 (1999), available at
http://www.iccat.int/Documents/BienRep/REP_EN_98-99_I_1.pdf [hereinafter ICCAT
Green Book 1999/1], which was extended by the “Supplemental Recommendation by
ICCAT Regarding Compliance in the Bluefin Tuna and Atlantic Swordfish Fisheries,”
ICCAT Report for Biennial Period 2000-01 Part II (2001), Vol. I, 217 (2002), available
at http://www.iccat.int/Documents/BienRep/REP_EN_00-01_II_1.pdf. A contingent
125% compensation standard in these fisheries is applicable if quota is exceeded during
two consecutive management periods. See ICCAT, Report for the Biennial Period 199697 Part I (1996), Vol. I, 95 (1997), available at http://www.iccat.int/Documents/
BienRep/REP_EN_96-97_I_1.pdf [hereinafter ICCAT Green Book 1997/1]. This rule
was extended to the southern swordfish stock in the “Recommendation by ICCAT
Regarding Compliance in the South Atlantic Swordfish Fishery.” ICCAT, Report for the
Biennial Period 1996-97 Part II (1997), Vol. I, 70 (1998), available at
http://www.iccat.int/Documents/BienRep/REP_EN_96-97_II_1.pdf.
The present
generalized rule is in the “Recommendation by ICCAT Regarding Compliance with
Management Measures which Define Quotas and/or Catch Limits:”
For any species under quota/catch limit management, underages/overages from
one year may be added/must be subtracted from the quota/catch limit of the
management period immediately after or one year after that year, unless any
recommendation on a stock specifically deals with overages/underages, in which
case that recommendation will take precedence.
ICCAT, Report for the Biennial Period 2000-01 Part I (2000), Vol. I, 148 (2001), available at
http://www.iccat.int/Documents/BienRep/REP_EN_00-01_I_1.pdf [hereinafter ICCAT Green
Book 2001/1]. The rule thus yields to the two years specified as the norm in the
“Recommendation by ICCAT Relating to the Rebuilding Program for North Atlantic
Swordfish,” ICCAT, Report for the Biennial Period 2002-03 Part I (2002), Vol. I, Annex
8.2, at 157 (2003), available at http://www.iccat.int/Documents/ BienRep/REP_EN_0203_I_1.pdf [hereinafter ICCAT Green Book 2003/1], and in the “Recommendation by
ICCAT Concerniing [sic] a Multi-Year Conservation and Management Plan for Bluefin
Tuna in the East Atlantic and Mediterranean,” id., Annex 8.8, at 167.
103. CCSBT-EC2 Report, supra note 66, Attachment 8-3, ¶ 4(4).
104. CCSBT, Report of the Extended Commission of the Fourteenth Annual Meeting,
Attachment 8-3, ¶ 4(5) (2007), available at http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/
meeting_reports/ccsbt_14/report_of_CCSBT14.pdf [hereinafter CCSBT-EC6 Report].
Sixty-nine tonnes left uncaught in 2003 were added back at the same time, id., Japan
claiming permission to do so because there was no binding CCSBT decision for that year,
id. at 8, ¶ 47.

2010]

Internationally Managed Fisheries

53

overcatch of sixteen tonnes in 1994 was paid back in 1995, thirty-seven
tonnes from 1999 was repaid in 2000, approximately twenty tonnes’
overcatch from 2000 was repaid in 2001, and the thirty-two tonnes of
overcatch from 2001 was accounted for in 2002.105
In 2003, Australia reported an incident to the CCSBT which was not
treated as overcatch, though it now would be under the remedial
measures adopted to prevent its repetition. A quantity of captured SBT
estimated at 132 tonnes had escaped from a tow cage before it had
reached the pens where the sampling process to determine its weight
would have taken place.106 On the best available information, fifteen
tonnes of SBT died in the incident, which was the amount debited
against the holder’s individual quota.107 As a result, Australia decided to
move from the system of deducting quota when the fish were transferred
from tow cages to static cages (including mortalities during the catching
and towing operations) to a provisional deduction of the estimated
weight at the time of capture.108
Since April 1, 2006, in response to the revelations of persistent past
overcatch, Japan has adhered to a system of individual vessel quotas,
allowing for the use of 142 vessels per year, with landing of SBT
restricted to eight designated ports, all to be monitored by government
105. CCSBT3(1) Report, supra note 63, at 10; CCSBT6(2) Report, supra note 68, at 9,
¶ 49; CCSBT, Report of the Special Meeting, at 6, ¶ 36 (2000), available at
http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/meeting_reports/ccsbt_6/report_of_special_meeting.pdf;
CCSBT-EC2 Report, supra note 66, Attachment 8-4, at 1. Given that the reported
overcatch of twenty tonnes in 2000 included twenty-three tonnes of Pacific bluefin
tuna—a different species—it appears that there was in fact no overcatch of SBT by New
Zealand in that year, which makes the repayment somewhat puzzling. CCSBT, Report of
the Seventh Annual Meeting, ¶ 10 (April 18-21, 2001), available at
http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/meeting_reports/ccsbt_7/report_of_ccsbt7.pdf [hereinafter
CCSBT7 Report]. Another curiosity is that, at the time of New Zealand’s original
announcement at the CCSBT’s 2002 meeting that it had overcaught its voluntary limit for
the 2001-02 season by thirty-two tonnes, it undertook to refrain from catching a
commensurate amount only in the 2003-04 season. CCSBT, Report of the Extended
Commission of the Ninth Annual Meeting, ¶ 35, at 6 (Oct. 15-18, 2002), available at,
http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/meeting_reports/ccsbt_9/report_of_ccsbt9.pdf [hereinafter
CCSBT-EC1 Report]. Taiwan also reacted rapidly to its 158-tonne overcatch in 2004,
announcing that it would be paid back in 2005. CCSBT-EC4 Report, supra note 64,
Attachment 8-2.
106. CCSBT-EC2 Report, supra note 66, at 4, ¶ 31.
107. Id. A separate 126-tonne overcatch was, however, debited against the next year’s
allocation. CCSBT, Report of the Extended Scientific Committee for the Ninth Meeting
of the Scientific Committee, at 2, ¶ 9 (2004), available at http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/
pdf/meeting_reports/ccsbt_11/report_of_sc9.pdf.
108. CCSBT-EC2 Report, supra note 66, at 4, ¶ 31.
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inspectors.109 Each fish must be individually tagged with a serial number
and the vessel’s call sign.110 Penalties for infringement are severe and
could result in suspension of quota for up to five years.111
B. Institutionalized Carryover of Overcatch and Undercatch
Although adherence to quotas is undeniably important for conserving
fish stocks, a limited degree of flexibility around them may assist
fisheries management. Allowing a modest proportion of uncaught quota
to be carried over into the next year removes the “use it or lose it”
incentive to try to fill the quota, with its inherent risk of overcatch.
Conversely, permitting a small amount of overcatch to be debited against
the following year’s quota may act as a political safety valve, offering
States facing domestic pressures to allow overfishing the alternative of
legitimately borrowing small amounts from the stock, provided there are
guarantees of repayment (as, in fact, occurred in the second-phase
incident of 1993). Although, as seen, a system along these lines has
developed ad hoc in the CCSBT, a suggestion that one be introduced
formally led to nothing. At the Eighth Meeting of the CCSBT in 2001,
Australia indicated that it was prepared to countenance members being
permitted to reconcile their catch against national allocations over a
three-year period with limits so as to provide operational flexibility, but
not if those allocations were increased from their last levels.112 As there
was no agreement on national allocations, this could not be pursued.
Australia’s 2002 overcatch, which was caused by a single operator,
highlights an additional complex consequence where there are individual
transferable quotas (ITQs) at the domestic level, but no year-to-year
accounting mechanism allowing an individual quota-holder’s overrun to
be debited against the holder’s quota for the following year. If, in that
situation, the State concerned adheres to established CCSBT practice by
declaring a commensurately lower domestic catch limit in the following
year, all quota-holders, whose quota is expressed in terms of a fixed
share of the total, compensate for the overcatch of one. This also creates
a powerful incentive for compliance-oriented peer pressure within the
fleet as long as overcatchers cannot remain anonymous—as was the case
here.

109.
110.
111.
112.

CCSBT-EC5 Report, supra note 99, Attachment 12-5, app. 3.
Id.
Id.
CCSBT8 Report, supra note 66, Attachment N-1.
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At the CCSBT’s 2004 meeting, New Zealand advised that the
introduction of SBT into its Quota Management System with certain
flexibility provisions was expected to affect its ability to balance catch
from one year to the next, “however NZ will ensure that on average the
catch from the fishery does not exceed the national allocation.”113 In not
seeking the CCSBT’s blessing for this, New Zealand thus appeared to be
implicitly asserting a claim to be permitted to do it on the basis that it
was by now established practice of other members. If so, its assessment
was correct: there were no protests. In substance, however, New
Zealand’s action was not very different from the unauthorized averaging
Taiwan had been conducting and which it undertook to cease when it
was exposed by the Trade Information Scheme.114
At the 2007 meeting, New Zealand tabled a draft resolution that
would allow for carryover of undercatch into the immediately following
year, but only if the national allocation for the next year was not less than
in the year of undercatch. Overcatch of 10% would be permitted without
penalty for a member whose national allocation was 500 tonnes or less,
and 2% for one of more than 500 tonnes, with penalties increasing in
three steps: 50%, 100%, and 200%; the highest rate reached at 50%
overcatch for a member whose national allocation was 500 tonnes or less
and 10% for others.115 The overcatch and any penalty would be deducted
over the following two years.116
Taiwan and Korea supported the proposal, as did Australia in
principle, though in its view the percentages required refinement so as to
avoid giving an economic incentive to overcatch. Japan had concerns
about carry-forward of undercatch given the low state of the SBT stock
and wished to consider the detail of the proposal further.117 New Zealand
was left to redraft the text in advance of the next meeting.118
Until this development, ICCAT had been somewhat more advanced
than CCSBT. Carryovers were already permitted in the northern

113. CCSBT-EC3 Report, supra note 66, Attachment 8-4, ¶ 8.
114. See infra note 211. In 2002, Taiwan admitted that it had managed its catch on a
five-year average of 1450 tonnes, though it would introduce yearly catch limits to replace
this. Thus, despite its catches in 1999 and 2000 of 1513 and 1638 tonnes respectively,
Taiwan calculated its average catch over 1996-2000 as 1387 tonnes. CCSBT8 Report,
supra note 66, at 6, ¶ 38.
115. CCSBT-EC6 Report, supra note 104, Attachment 12, ¶ 4.
116. Id.
117. CCSBT-EC6 Report, supra note 104, at 25, ¶¶ 134-37.
118. Id. at 26, ¶ 140.
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albacore fishery, though not until 2007 in its southern counterpart.119 In
2004, the European Community had proposed that there be a general rule
for management and application of unders and overs, but debate on this
matter was thrice deferred to 2007. When the debate did occur the
Community withdrew its proposal in favor of a new alternative from the
U.S., which failed to be adopted for lack of support.120 In the original
draft recommendation tabled by the Community,121 there was an unclear
distinction between “management measures” (for which overcatch would
be debited against the next year’s allocation or that of the subsequent
year, whereas undercatch of up to 10% could be carried forward into
future years, subject to a cumulative maximum of 30%; it is not clear
what effect a change in national allocation in the interim would have had
on the last figure) and “application measures” (for which overage would
always be debited in the next year, and at a rate of 125% if it occurred in
two years in succession). It may not be coincidental that the Community
lost interest in promoting its idea just when its own 2006 overcatch of the
eastern stock of Atlantic bluefin tuna (ABT) came to be brought to
account. Arguing in mitigation that quota would have been available to
cover the excess had it not declined to carry forward its undercatch of
2004, the Community persuaded its fellow members to let it repay the

119. ICCAT’s original 50% carryover limit for the northern albacore stock has now
been reduced to 25%. See ICCAT, Report for Biennial Period 2002-03 Part II (2003),
Vol. 1, at 144, ¶ 6 (2004) [hereinafter ICCAT Green Book 2004/1], available at
http://www.iccat.int/Documents/BienRep/REP_EN_02-03_II_1.pdf; ICCAT, Report for
Biennial Period 2006-07 Part II (2007), Vol. 1, ¶ 6, at 150 (2008) [hereinafter ICCAT
Green Book 2008/1], available at http://www.iccat.int/Documents/BienRep/
REP_EN_06-07_II_1.pdf. See also ICCAT, Report for Biennial Period 2004-05 Part I,
Vol. 1, at 130 (2005) [hereinafter ICCAT Green Book 2005/1] available at
http://www.iccat.int/Documents/BienRep/REP_EN_04-05_I_1.pdf. For the bigeye stock,
a maximum of 30% of underage may be carried over to either of the next two years. Id.
at 126.
120. It was first deferred in 2004. See ICCAT Green Book 2005/1, supra note 119, at
191. In 2005 it was deferred for a second time, when the Standing Committee on
Research and Statistics was asked to provide scientific advice on the possible
conservation impacts on a stock-by-stock basis of carrying forward undercatch. See
ICCAT Green Book 2006/1, supra note 51, at 216. The third and final deferral was in
2006. See ICCAT Green Book 2007/1, supra note 9, at 241. See also ICCAT Green
Book 2008/1, supra note 119, at 40 (providing the very brief report of the consideration
of the European and U.S. proposals).
121. ICCAT Green Book 2005/1, supra note 119, at 255.
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excess over not two, but three years122—something not foreseen by the
existing regulation, so that an amendment to it had to be adopted.123
On the other hand, possibly because of the large tonnages involved,
Taiwan’s overcatch of 8000 tonnes of bigeye tuna, and China’s
overcatch of an unspecified amount, were permitted to be compensated
for by yearly deductions of 1600 tonnes and 500 tonnes, respectively,
from 2005 to 2009.124 ICCAT’s Working Group, considering the
development of a compendium of its recommendations and resolutions,
has also requested clarification from the parent commission of how
overcatch and undercatch of transferred quotas should be treated.125
C. Conversion Factors
Before each fish can be measured and weighed, it is often necessary
to carry out some initial processing, such as gilling and gutting. Since
national allocations of SBT are by necessary implication in whole weight
(the only common measurement that allows like to be compared with
like), a formula is needed for converting the weight of every processed
fish into what it would have weighed at the moment of its capture. An
inaccurate conversion factor can lead to an overcatch of quota, deliberate
or not, that would otherwise be difficult to detect.126 There would thus
seem to be a need to impose uniform conversion factors (or at least a
formula relating whole weight to processed weight for different weights

122. ICCAT Green Book 2008/1, supra note 119, at 215, 218.
123. Id. at 152. Though not opposing this recommendation, the U.S. called for the
compliance process to be reformed, id. at 248-49, and decried ICCAT’s “overall picture
of persistent compliance lapses” and “unwillingness to apply the available corrective
instruments, namely quota penalties,” id. at 249.
124. ICCAT Green Book 2005/1, supra note 119, at 126. Note, however, that Japan
calculated China’s 2003 overage as 3903 tonnes, an amount greater than the 2500 tonnes
implied by the decision. Id. at 245. The combination of this discrepancy and the lack of
a precise figure for China’s overcatch in the report suggests that the figure was disputed
and that the decision ultimately made was a compromise.
125. ICCAT Green Book 2005/1, supra note 119, at 122-23. Failing to receive an
answer to its specific question as to whether the 50% northern albacore carry-over in ¶ 6
of the relevant recommendation was applicable to the catch limit of 200 tonnes available
by ¶ 3 to any member not mentioned by name, the following year the Working Group
submitted to the Commission for approval its own affirmative answer. ICCAT Green
Book 2006/1, supra note 51, at 143-44.
126. Or, as the Commission coyly put it, “inappropriate conversion factors will
influence the number of fish which may be taken within the quota.” CCSBT, Report of
the Second Annual Meeting, at 6 (1995), available at www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/
meeting_reports/ccsbt_2/report_of_ccsbt2.pdf.
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of fish and different processing techniques). The CCSBT has not done
this, but in 1996 noted a report from its Scientific Committee indicating
that a conversion factor of 1.15 that the members’ scientists used had
proved to be unsatisfactory.127 According to Australia and New Zealand,
it had resulted in the total weight of the longline catch being
underestimated.128 On the other hand, Japan considered that because the
current TAC had been calculated on current conversion factors, the
CCSBT should adjust the TAC commensurately if it were to adopt the
Scientific Committee’s new conversion factor.129 Australia and New
Zealand acknowledged this the following year,130 and the CCSBT has not
since taken any action on the matter.
D. Farmed Fish
The farming of fish can be a complicating factor, as has been the
case in respect of Australia’s farming of SBT at Port Lincoln in South
Australia. The reason is twofold.
First, because farmed fish are not killed at capture, it is much more
difficult to ascertain their weight at that time, which is the significant
weight for quota purposes. This matter has been raised in the CCSBT,
where in 1996 Japan questioned Australia’s procedure for estimating
tonnages of farmed fish catches to debit against its quota. Japan
highlighted the likely high mortality of purse-seined fish, suggested that
the fish could lose weight subsequent to capture, and emphasized the
need for observers on the vessels.131 In response, Australia advised that
127. CCSBT3(1) Report, supra note 64, at 15. In Australia, under Regulation 7 of the
Fisheries Management (Southern Bluefin Tuna Fishery) Regulations 1995, the
conversion factor from processed weight to whole weight is 1.176. New Zealand law
provides for a conversion factor for gilled and gutted SBT of 1.15 if the tail is removed,
or 1.10 if the tail is left on. Fisheries (Conversion Factors) Notice 2005, Schedule 2, Part
II, item 26, available at www.fish.govt.nz/NR/rdonlyres/E264B2E8-4B02-4FA5-854091B737D45499/0/CFNoticeSchedules.pdf.
128. CCSBT3(1) Report, supra note 64, at 19, 20, 22.
129. Id. at 22. It follows from the circumstances that the adjustment would have been
upwards. This appears justified since the stock assessments are conducted on the basis of
number of fish, not weight. CCSBT4(1) Report, supra note 65, at 12. This is
corroborated by the Scientific Committee’s comment that, as long as the same conversion
factor is used both in the projections and in calculating removals from the fishery, it
should not result in any bias in the projections. CCSBT3(1) Report, supra note 64, at 3
(reference not reproduced in PDF; full document on file with the Commonwealth
Scientific and Industrial Research Organization, Marine Division).
130. CCSBT4(1) Report, supra note 65, at 12.
131. CCSBT3(1) Report, supra note 64, at 11.
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all transfers were monitored by compliance staff, and that fish were
counted using underwater video and sampled for weight to develop a
tonnage estimate.132 There was an obligation to report all mortalities
occurring at capture and prior to transfer to rearing cages for debit
against quota.133 Dead fish were removed from cages during the towing
process and their weight duly debited.134 The mortality during towing
and transferring was reported at 1.4% in the 1995 season and 1.5% in
1996.135 Since feeding in tow cages commenced soon after capture, they
might well have gained weight during the two or three weeks between
their capture and arrival in the Port Lincoln fish farms.136
Updating this information some years later, Australia advised that in
the 2000 and 2001 seasons compliance officers from the Australian
Fisheries Management Authority (AFMA) were deployed on farm tow
vessels to observe procedures.137 AFMA also conducted boat inspections
in port and monitored all transfers of fish to farm cages.138 In response to
further questioning in 2002, Australia confirmed that mortalities in
purse-seines and tow cages were factored into the catch data presented to
the CCSBT.139 At the CCSBT’s 2003 Meeting, Australia advised that
specific procedures had been introduced for research and monitoring of
SBT farming operations.140 An independent company was contracted
annually by AFMA to monitor the operations.141 All mortalities
occurring during the capture and towing operations must be recorded on
the appropriate form and be available for inspection if requested by an
AFMA officer.142 When SBT are transferred from tow cages to the fish
farms, a video recording must be made by the contractor, which is then
used to count the fish transferred into the farm.143 This count is

132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. CCSBT8 Report, supra note 66, Attachment K-1.
138. Id.
139. CCSBT-EC1 Report, supra note 105, at 5. See also CCSBT-EC3 Report, supra
note 66, at Attachment 8.1.
140. CCSBT-EC2 Report, supra note 66, Attachment 8-1, ¶ 7.
141. Id.
142. Id. This requirement has been enacted into Australian law. See Southern Bluefin
Tuna Fishery Management Plan 1995, c. 22A (Austl.), supra note 72.
143. CCSBT-EC2 Report, supra note 66, Attachment 8-1, ¶ 7. This requirement has
also been enacted into Australian law. See Southern Bluefin Tuna Fishery Management
Plan 1995, c. 22B.1-.2 (Austl.), supra note 72.
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multiplied by the mean weight derived from a sample of 40 fish, and
debited against the quota using the Farm Disposal Record.144
Second, even if, on the strength of the procedures just listed, the
reported weights are assumed to be free of any systematic downward
bias, with almost all of Australia’s SBT catch now fattened further in the
farms, the weight of these fish when ultimately sent to market will be
substantially higher than at their time of capture. Starting in 1997,
Japanese import statistics began to show imports of SBT from Australia
to be greater than Australia’s quota of 5265 tonnes: more than 6000
tonnes in 1997 and 1998; nearly 7000 tonnes in 1999; and over 7800
tonnes in 2000.145
In response to Japan’s questioning of Australia’s adherence to its
quota, Australia gave information to the CCSBT showing that its catch
never exceeded its national allocation. At a 1997 meeting, Australia
reported an average mortality of SBT after counting of 5%, with an
average time spent in pens of around four months.146 The losses were
mainly due to seals, parasites, and storms.147 At the CCSBT’s Seventh
Meeting in 2001, Australia advised that it would carry out a scientific
assessment of growth rates of farmed SBT,148 and at the Eighth Meeting
later that year Australia presented a paper on growth rates on farms,
reporting that “weight increases in the order of 93% were being obtained
from farming SBT, and [that] further increases could be expected as
techniques improved.”149
The issue remains controversial and the subject of close questioning
by Japan at CCSBT meetings, possibly as a tactic to divert attention from
the issue of Japan’s past overcatch, since from 2006 onwards it has
invariably been raised in association with the latter.150 Although doubts
144. CCSBT-EC2 Report, supra note 66, Attachment 8-1, ¶ 7. This requirement has
been enacted into Australian law. See Southern Bluefin Tuna Fishery Management Plan
1995, c. 22B.2 (Austl.), supra note 72.
145. CCSBT7 Report, supra note 105, Attachment F-2, app. 2.
146. CCSBT4(1) Report, supra note 65, Attachment P, ¶ 2.
147. Id.
148. CCSBT7 Report, supra note 105, ¶ 31.
149. CCSBT8 Report, supra note 66, at 6. If 98% of Australia’s annual quota of 5265
tonnes were farmed and exported to Japan after a weight increase of 93%, only imports
above 9958 tonnes would conclusively indicate overcatch, and then, only if it occurred in
two successive years (because catch takes time to reach the market and the quota year is
not the same as the calendar year used in Japan’s trade statistics). See infra note 191. In
2001, however, Japan imported only 8237 tonnes of SBT from Australia.. CCSBT-EC2
Report, supra note 66, Attachment 8-3, ¶ 8(3). It is unclear, however, whether the 93% is
gross or net of losses.
150. See generally infra notes 239-42 and accompanying text.
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about the Australian accounting procedure were not wholly dispelled at a
special meeting on the two issues, the CCSBT as a whole in taking no
remedial action appears to have accepted Australia’s criticisms that the
statistical methods used to generate these doubts are flawed; two
members of the independent panel found that the data were not
sufficiently robust to support any finding of overcatch, while the other
two, though agreeing, proceeded nonetheless to produce from those data
estimates of overcatch ranging from 18% to 49.5%.151 If anything, the
fact that fish smaller than 10 kg are excluded from the forty-fish sample
produces an upward bias, which, according to an independent expert,
would lead to a likely overestimate of catch by 2%-4%.152 The
Independent Review of Australian SBT Farming Operations Anomalies
also concluded that “the regulation of the industry is a rigorous and well
managed process with no apparent anomalies and no scope for overcatch via misreporting.”153
Instead, at Japan’s request, Australia was to carry out a study
beginning in 2007 to estimate: (a) representativeness or bias of the fortyfish sample used to estimate weight; (b) weight change during towing;
(c) accuracy in the counting of dead fish during towing; (d) accuracy in
growth rate during farming; and (e) the number of fish transferred into
farming pens. Australia hoped to finalize (a), (c), and (e) during the first
year and planned to report to the Scientific Committee in time for its
annual meeting in mid-2007.154 This was not entirely achieved, but an
extensive debate was held on the matter at the 2007 meeting.155
Japan has mounted similar arguments in ICCAT regarding farming
of ABT by Croatia and Turkey (with similar responses from those
States156) resulting in the adoption of successive recommendations on the
matter.157 In 2002, a working group debated tuna farming, and in 2003,

151. CCSBT, Report of the Fifth Special Meeting of the Commission, app. 3, at 2, ¶¶ 812 and Attachment 7 (2006) available at http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/meeting_reports/
ccsbt_13/report_of_special_meeting_2006.pdf.
152. CCSBT-EC6 Report, supra note 104, at 8, ¶ 48.
153. Id. at 20, ¶ 106. It is not clear whether the original report, which the CCSBT has
not made public, is also the source of the estimate in the previous footnote.
154. CCSBT-EC5 Report, supra note 99, at 7-8, ¶¶ 42-44.
155. CCSBT-EC6 Report, supra note 104, at 15-20, ¶¶ 91-107. See also id. at 8-9, ¶¶
48-51.
156. ICCAT Green Book 2006/1, supra note 51, at 230-32. See also id. at 233-35;
ICCAT Green Book 2004/1, supra note 119, at 206.
157. The original was the “Recommendation by ICCAT on Bluefin Tuna Farming.”
See ICCAT Green Book 2003/1, supra note 102, at 171. The current one at the time of
writing, which completely replaced its predecessor (despite its title) is the

62

OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 15:1

there was further discussion in one of ICCAT’s species panels, where the
European Community said that “farming does not constitute, in itself, a
threat to fish stocks, as long as it is carefully monitored and
controlled.”158 Japan, by contrast, was concerned principally about
farming by non-members of ICCAT.159
E. Bycatch and Discarding
Although prohibition on the taking of fish below a certain size is a
common fisheries management measure,160 either directly (as is the only
option in the case of longlining, in which the hooks do not discriminate
between fish of different sizes) or in terms of mesh size of nets, the
CCSBT has not sought, at any stage, to regulate the SBT fisheries on this
basis. The size of fish taken is significant because of its differential
impact on the stock per tonne of catch, if more spawning potential is lost
in the larger number of small fish needed to make up a tonne than in a
smaller number of large fish. The issue has been raised at CCSBT
meetings in two contexts.
The first context is the relatively greater impact on stock per tonne of
catch of small fish. Composed of immature fish, Australia’s large
surface fishery catches did not immediately affect the parental biomass,
as it took several years for the removal of young fish to be reflected as
reduced survival to maturity. Conversely, the benefit of a surface fishery
catch restriction would not have been observed as an improvement in
parental biomass for several years. In contrast, because the longline
fishery catch (which comprised predominantly adult SBT) had an
immediate impact on parental biomass, reducing longline catches would
have reduced in severity or prevented the further decline in parental
biomass. The mid-1980s trilateral scientific reports showed that 1 tonne
of surface fishery catch had at that time roughly the same impact on
parental biomass as 2.25 tonnes of longline catch because of the far
greater number of fish per tonne of surface catch.161
“Recommendation by ICCAT to Amend the Recommendation on Bluefin Tuna
Farming.” See ICCAT Green Book 2006/1, supra note 51, at 160-63.
158. ICCAT Green Book 2003/1, supra note 102, at 235-36, ¶¶ 4.4-4.8. See also
ICCAT Green Book 2004/1, supra note 119, at 184.
159. ICCAT Green Book 2004/1, supra note 119, at 185.
160. For example ICCAT has had a series of minimum size limits for ABT. See
ICCAT Green Book 2005/1, supra note 119, at 123, ¶ 7.
161. CATON ET AL., supra note 78, at 28. The ratio of 2.25:1 is consistent with the
slope of the dotted line in Figure 1 in TRILATERAL SCIENTIFIC REPORTS COMPENDIUM,
supra note 58, at 30. The scientists’ equation in the two previous years of the effect on
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The second context calls into question the continued desirability of
discriminating by size at all when catch is limited by tonnage. In 1996,
Japan announced at the Third Meeting of the CCSBT that its industry
had adopted a policy of returning to the sea fish of less than 25 kg alive
at the time of retrieval.162 In response to an Australian query, Japan
advised that it assumed a survival rate of 55% of the returned fish and
counted the 45% mortality against its quota.163 This accounted for 711
tonnes of its declared catch for 1995 of 5866 tonnes, the mean weight of
non-retained fish being 20.1 kg.164 Australia questioned the assumption,
noting that in the Scientific Committee a quite different rate had been
suggested by Japan.165 New Zealand called for the CCSBT to develop a
uniform policy on non-retention of fish.166 It did not, but rather merely
called on its members to encourage consistent observation by their fleets
of whatever policy each might adopt.167 At the CCSBT’s Fourth
Meeting, Japan announced that from 1997 the policy of releasing small
SBT no longer applied.168
It may be noted that, if there were a positive requirement to debit
against quota all fish taken on board a vessel regardless of their
subsequent fate, there could be no objection on conservation grounds to
the superimposition of a policy of returning smaller fish to the sea if still
alive (although the difficulty of enforcement possibly explains why this
is not done). It would depend on the balance of desirability between
limitation of absolute catch by weight and influencing the size
composition of the catch. The pendulum may be expected to swing back
and forth from time to time, depending on the state of the stock.
A second reason for discarding fish subject to quota is that the
operator catching them may have taken them as bycatch, but lack quota
to cover them. At the Sixth Meeting of the CCSBT in 2000, Japan,
armed with Australian press clippings, raised allegations over the
discarding of 250 to 400 tonnes of SBT by Australian east coast
the parental biomass of surface catch of 11,000 tonnes and 26,000 tonnes of longline
catch given the 1981 age composition of the stock, with 14,500 tonnes each of surface
and longline catch, id. at 15, implies a ratio of roughly 3.3:1, and subsequently of 13,500
tonnes of surface catch and 27,000 tonnes of longline catch with 18,000 tonnes each of
surface and longline catch of 2:1, id. at 20.
162. CCSBT3(1) Report, supra note 64, Attachment G, ¶ 1(3).
163. CCSBT3(1) Report, supra note 64, at 9-10.
164. Id. at 10.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 28.
168. CCSBT4(1) Report, supra note 65, at 5.
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longliners for lack of quota and asked how catch discarded in this way
was treated under Australia’s quota management regime; in particular,
whether and how it was debited against quota.169 Not replying directly,
Australia stated that it was prepared to prosecute offenders given
sufficient evidence, but pointed out the economic motives of those
making the allegations and added that there had always been SBT taken
on the east coast, with Australian quota remaining available to cover
these catches.170
The question was pursued further when the meeting resumed for a
second session some months later. Australia now clarified that those
likely to catch SBT along the east coast were free to purchase or lease
quota.171 Implicitly admitting that there was substance to Japan’s
allegations, Australia advised that it would nonetheless introduce a
system of rolling closures following the progression of migrating SBT
along the east coast, from May through September.172 Henceforth, only
those with 500 kg or more of quota could operate in the closed area, with
the location and movement of vessels monitored through the requirement
that each carry an approved satellite-based monitoring system.173 At the
CCSBT’s Seventh Meeting, Australia declared a catch in the 2000
season of 5257 tonnes, just 8 tonnes under its voluntary limit, of which
114 tonnes were caught off New South Wales and Tasmania by 37
longliners that operated off New South Wales between May and
November of that year, with closure of waters south of Sydney between
June and August to those lacking sufficient quota.174 In the following
year, Australia advised that in the 2001 season it had introduced an

169. CCSBT, Report for the Sixth Annual Meeting, First Part, at 5, ¶ 33 (1999)
available at http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/meeting_reports/ccsbt_6/report_of_ccsbt6_
Part1.pdf [hereinafter CCSBT6(1) Report]. See also id. Attachment C, ¶ 6(3).
170. Id. at 5, ¶ 33. The reference to economic motives is an allusion to the East Coast
Tuna Boat Owners’ Association Inc., which lobbied for ITQs to be made available free of
charge to its members whose longliners caught SBT as bycatch, despite the fact that they
had previously held such quota but sold it to South Australian operators. The New South
Wales longline catch was 475 tonnes in 1998, only 97 tonnes in 1999 when the
allegations were raised, then 114 tonnes in 2000, 60 tonnes in 2001 and 22 tonnes in 2002
(these figures include, for data confidentiality reasons, various combinations of
Queensland and Tasmanian longline catch and New South Wales pole-and-line catch in
successive seasons, as data from groups of less than five boats may not be released).
CCSBT-EC2 Report, supra note 66, Attachment 8-1 at 1, 4, Table 1.
171. CCSBT6(2) Report, supra note 68, at 9, ¶ 54.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 9-10, ¶ 54.
174. CCSBT7 Report, supra note 105, Attachment F-1, ¶¶ 1-7.
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ongoing audit of fishing records,175 and added in 2003 that access to the
waters off Western Australia through which SBT migrate had also been
restricted in the same way since 2001.176
Australia’s most recent annual report to the CCSBT, which states
that since 2004 the restricted access zone has been divided into a core
zone and a buffer zone, indicates that there is still a problem. Since
2005, operators with less than 500 kg of quota have again been allowed
into both zones between May and October, but only with 100% observer
coverage.177 In the buffer zone, those with more than 500 kg of quota are
required to have 25% observer coverage.178 In the core zone, 100%
coverage is required for those with less than 2 tonnes of quota, 75% for
those with between 2 and 5 tonnes, 50% for those with between 5 and 10
tonnes, 25% up to 20 tonnes, and 10% coverage above that figure.179
In the longer term, bycatch by members must be distinguished from
bycatch by vessels of non-member States, most of which remain outside
the commission precisely because their fishing fleets have no interest in
the SBT fishery. The easiest way to avoid adverse legal consequences
from any genuinely inadvertent catch of SBT is to dump the fish
overboard. If the aim is to minimize mortality, it is immaterial whether
fish that are already dead are dumped at sea or landed. Since, however,
verifiable scientific information is gained only if they are landed, this is
an argument for using the UNCLOS Article 118 duty of cooperation to
discourage dumping,180 through treating bycatch leniently, despite the
risk of creating a perverse incentive to misreport as bycatch fish that are
deliberately taken.181
175. CCSBT8 Report, supra note 66, Attachment K-1 at 3, ¶ 7.
176. CCSBT-EC2 Report, supra note 66, Attachment 8-1 at 3, ¶ 7.
177. P.I. Hobsbawn et al., Australia’s Annual Review of the Southern Bluefin Tuna
Fishery, in CCSBT-EC6, supra note 104, Attachment 8-1, ¶ 4.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Referring to anadromous species, William T. Burke concludes that UNCLOS
Article 66 applies to both directed fishing and bycatch, arguing that “[i]f a significant
portion of the catch is beyond regulatory control, the coastal state either cannot act to take
adequate conservation measures or can only take ineffective measures.” See WILLIAM T.
BURKE, THE NEW INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FISHERIES: UNCLOS 1982 AND BEYOND 140
(Oxford University Press 1994).
181. Australian legislation requires quota for all landed species subject to quota, but
policy allows quota to be purchased or leased by the 15th day of the following month to
cover over-quota landings of bycatch species. G. Geen, W. Nielander & T.F. Meany,
Australian Experience with Individual Transferable Quota Systems, in ORGANIZATION
FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE USE OF INDIVIDUAL QUOTAS IN
FISHERIES MANAGEMENT 84 (OECD 1993) [hereinafter Geen et al.]. The same authors
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The practice in some of ICCAT’s fisheries of tolerating small
catches of species under quota up to a given limit—for instance 200
tonnes of northern albacore tuna182—may be of assistance in this regard.
For instance, suppose catch of less than ten tonnes of SBT were deemed
by CCSBT as bycatch not warranting the imposition of any trade
measures under the Action Plan. Such a policy would be aimed at the
operations of non-members and vessels whose actions undermine the
CCSBT’s management arrangements, so as to encourage them to join the
Commission or cooperate with its arrangements.183 Since the number of
States and fishing entities at any given time is finite, a rule of this kind at
ten tonnes for each would equate to a tolerance limit of catch by nonmembers under this head of around 1900 tonnes in theory, but a great
deal less in practice if the limits are non-transferable. By contrast, a
system of trading in quota might be needed for catch over the
threshold.184 In order to avoid the Action Plan measures, the nonmember would be required to purchase quota from a member to cover its
whole catch, which could only be done by acceding to the 1993
Convention or becoming a cooperating non-member if the trading
scheme were confined to these. For those within the system, the best
policy may be to estimate bycatch mortality for building into TAC
calculations.185

advocate use of a deemed value or surrender price method to discourage dumping of
bycatch species without inadvertently encouraging their targeting. Id. at 85. See also
Roger Falloon & T.M. Berthold, Individual Transferable Quotas The New Zealand Case,
in ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE USE OF
INDIVIDUAL QUOTAS IN FISHERIES MANAGEMENT 57-58 (OECD 1993). But these do not
appear easily replicated on the international plane.
182. ICCAT Green Book 2005/1, supra note 119, Annex 4.3, app. 3 at 123, ¶ 2. Faced
with a problem of discarding in the Northern Atlantic swordfish fishery, ICCAT designed
its rebuilding plan for the stock on the basis that it “must account for all sources of
fishing mortality.” ICCAT, Report for Biennial Period 1998-99 Part II (1999), Vol. 1,
Annex 5.2 at 69 (2000) [hereinafter ICCAT Green Book 2000/1], available at
http://www.iccat.int/Documents/BienRep/REP_EN_98-99_II_1.pdf.
Note the part
played in this by carry-forward of unders and overs. Id. at 71, ¶¶ 4, 5.
183. CCSBT6(2) Report, supra note 68, at 3, ¶ 14. The text of the Action Plan forms
Attachment I to the Report.
184. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
185. Steven Cunningham, Outcome of the Workshop on Individual Quota
Management, in ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE
USE OF INDIVIDUAL QUOTAS IN FISHERIES MANAGEMENT 13 (OECD 1993).
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F. Other Non-Commercial Catch
The nearer quota comes to being perceived as a tradable asset, the
more interest members will have in ensuring that all sources of catch are
accounted for, since it would be more obvious than under the traditional
national allocation system that any perceived gain by one member of an
unfair advantage comes at the other members’ expense. Bycatch is the
most obvious potential source of friction in this regard, but other forms
of non-commercial catch are recreational, indigenous, and scientific
catch. There may be some overlap among the categories.186
Recreational fishing limits typically impose a bag limit per person
per day of a small number of fish. Since there is generally no limit to the
number of persons engaging in recreational fishing, or on how many
days per year they may fish, it follows that there is no effective upper
limit to the total recreational catch in any jurisdiction. Such limits apply
to SBT in most Australian States187 and South Africa,188 but not New
Zealand.
186. At the 2004 CCSBT meeting, Australia advised that discussions were underway
with its game fish association for all recreationally caught SBT to be tagged and released,
with the release data to be provided to the CCSBT. Since the research tagging was
opportunistic rather than a planned experiment, no research mortality allowance was
made available to cover it; instead, any associated mortality would count against
Australia’s national allocation. CCSBT-EC3 Report, supra note 66, at 11-12, ¶¶ 78, 79.
187. In New South Wales, there is a combined possession limit of two tuna (albacore,
bigeye, longtail, SBT, or yellowfin) 90 cm in length or more, and five of the same species
smaller than 90 cm. New South Wales Department of Primary Industries, Fishing and
Aquaculture, Bag and Size Limits – Saltwater, www.dpi.nsw.gov.au/fisheries/
recreational/regulations/sw/sw-bag-and-size#Finfish-Bag-and-Size-limits (last visited
Sept. 27, 2009). South Australia has a combined SBT and yellowfin tuna limit of two per
person and six per boat. Government of South Australia, Primary Industries and
Resources, Catch Limits & Legal Lengths, www.pir.sa.gov.au/fisheries/
recreational_fishing/catch_limits_and_legal_lengths (last visited Sept. 27, 2009).
Tasmania has a “combined possession limit” per person of two SBT, yellowfin, and
bigeye tuna. Tasmania Department of Primary Industries, Parks, Water and Environment,
Bag and Possession Limits, www.dpiw.tas.gov.au/inter.nsf/WebPages/HMUY-5TA4EU?open
(last visited Sept. 27, 2009). Victoria’s limit is two per person. Victoria Department of Primary
Industries, New Recreational Catch Limits from 2009, http://www.dpi.vic.gov.au/DPI/
nrenfaq.nsf/LinkView/D158413C52C3F077CA25755300158AEC863080215E41289ECA257
53D0013A569/$file/Fact%20sheet%20-%20New%20recreational%20Fisheries%20Regulations
%20from%202%20March%202009.pdf (last visited Sept. 27, 2009). Western Australia is
divided into four regions for recreational fishing purposes, but in all four there is a combined
daily bag limit per angler of two SBT, bigeye, and yellowfin tuna. Government of Western
Australia, South Coast Bag and Size Limits, http://www.fish.wa.gov.au/docs/pub/SouthLimits/
SouthCoastRules_2009.pdf (last visited Sept. 27, 2009); Government of Western Australia,
Recreational Fishing Guide – West Coast Region, http://www.fish.wa.gov.au/docs/pub/
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Recreational catch has become an issue within the CCSBT.
Australia reported in 2002 that it was discussing the matter with State
Governments, but in any event was far enough short of its national
allocation to accommodate any recreational catch of SBT.189 This must
be doubted if the high recreational catch of eighty-five tonnes for that
year, a figure estimated by the New South Wales Government,190 is to be
believed. Australia’s feeble response to the questions posed to it at the
2007 meeting do not make its position any more credible, though this
may change if it carries out its intention to provide a report to the
CCSBT on the management of its recreational fishery.191 New Zealand
reported in 2003 that recreational fishing for SBT was limited, though
historical catches before records began may have been higher.192 It
advised that it had reserved four tonnes of its national allocation to cover
recreational catch, which it considered sufficient for its recreational
fishery.193
Since the resolution of the 1998-2001 dispute over Japan’s unilateral
experimental fishing, the CCSBT has also developed a history of
allocating modest tonnages for scientific catches that do not count
against national allocations. There is precedent for this in ICCAT, which
has exempted participants’ catches of up to fifteen tonnes of ABT from

WestLimits/westcoast_rules_2008.pdf (last visited Sept. 27, 2009); Government of Western
Australia, Recreational Fishing Guide – Gascoyne Region, http://www.fish.wa.gov.au/docs/
pub/GascoyneLimits/gascoyne_rules2009.pdf (last visited Sept. 27, 2009); Government of
Western Australia, Recreational Fishing Guide – North Coast Region,
http://www.fish.wa.gov.au/docs/pub/NorthLimits/NorthernCoastRules_2009.pdf (last visited
Sept. 27, 2009). No limit appears to apply in Queensland.
188. In 1994, the recreational catch limit in South Africa was reported to be ten of any
tuna species per person per day. A.J. Penney, National Report of South Africa, in
ICCAT, Report for Biennial Period 1994-95 Part I (1994), Vol. 1, 259, ¶ 3 (1995),
available at http://www.iccat.int/Documents/BienRep/REP_EN_94-95_I_1.pdf. It was
unchanged in 2003, with the same size limits in the Marine Living Resources Act 1998
also applying to the recreational sector. ICCAT, Report for Biennial Period 2002-03
Part II (2003), Vol.3, 87, ¶ 3.2 (2004) [hereinafter ICCAT Green Book 2004/3], available
at http://www.iccat.int/Documents/BienRep/REP_EN_02-03_II_3.pdf..
189. CCSBT-EC1 Report, supra note 105, at 5, 11, ¶¶ 35, 75.
190. P.I. Hobsbawn et al., Australia’s Annual Review of the Southern Bluefin Tuna
Fishery, in CCSBT-EC5 Report, supra note 99, Attachment 12-1, ¶ 4, Table 6.
191. CCSBT-EC6 Report, supra note 104, at 9, 20-21, ¶¶ 53, 108-112.
192. CCSBT-EC2 Report, supra note 66, Attachment 8-4, ¶ 3. The indigenous noncommercial catch was also counted against New Zealand’s national allocation. See
CCSBT-EC3 Report, supra note 66, Attachment 8-4, ¶¶ 2, 5.
193. CCSBT-EC3 Report, supra note 66, at 12, ¶ 80.
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For the various
otherwise applicable conservation measures.194
components of the Scientific Research Program, the members and the
Secretariat from 2001 onwards requested, and the CCSBT approved, the
following mortality allowances: for tagging programs, sixty-five tonnes
in 2002 and forty tonnes in 2003; for other research by Japan, 3.6 tonnes
in 2001 and 6.5 tonnes in 2002; and, for a series of spawning ground and
acoustic surveys, ten tonnes in 2003.195 Research mortalities of fortyseven tonnes were approved in 2004 for an acoustic survey (one tonne)
and various tagging projects (forty-six tonnes); the like total for 2005
was fifty-one tonnes, and in 2006 it was twenty-two tonnes.196 In 2007,
Australia sought ten tonnes to cover the expected mortality of 7.5 tonnes
in an experiment on stereo video recording of transfer of SBT into farm
cages, but the meeting report does not reveal whether this or any other
research allowance was granted to any member.197
ICCAT, too, has dealt on several occasions with non-commercial
catch. For example, in 1999, it passed an across-the-board resolution on
recreational fishery statistics and in 2006 it created a Working Group on
Sport and Recreational Fisheries.198

194. See ICCAT Green Book 2001/1, supra note 102, at 141, ¶ 3. This policy has
continued since, and with a further fifteen tonnes of other tunas. ICCAT, Report for
Biennial Period 2000-01 Part II (2001), Vol. 1, Annex 9-8, at 222, ¶ 3 (2002), available
at http://www.iccat.int/Documents/BienRep/REP_EN_00-01_II_1.pdf.
195. CCSBT8 Report, supra note 66, at 8, ¶¶ 13, 54, 95, 97; CCSBT-EC1 Report,
supra note 105, at 15, ¶¶ 97-100. See also CCSBT, Report of the Extended Scientific
Committee for the Eighth Meeting of the Scientific Committee at 19, ¶ 106 (Sept. 1-4,
2003),
available
at
http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/meeting_reports/ccsbt_10/
report_of_sc8.pdf; CCSBT-EC2 Report, supra note 66, at 13, ¶¶ 70-71. Not all the
allowances were caught: in 2002 only 0.8 tonnes had been used for the Japanese
spawning ground survey and 13.28 tonnes for tagging programs. Id. ¶ 69.
196. CCSBT-EC3 Report, supra note 66, at 12-13, ¶¶ 87-89; CCSBT-EC4 Report,
supra note 64, at ¶ 124; CCSBT-EC5 Report, supra note 99, at 18, ¶ 103. See also
CCSBT, Eleventh Meeting of the Scientific Committee, at 24-25, ¶¶ 133-136 (2006),
available
at
http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/meeting_reports/ccsbt_13/report_of_
SC11.pdf.
197. CCSBT-EC6 Report, supra note 104, at 16, ¶ 93.
198. ICCAT Green Book 2000/1, supra note 182, at 78. See also ICCAT Green Book
2007/1, supra note 9, at 175.

70

OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 15:1

G. Misalignment of Fishing Seasons
The staggered fishing seasons of CCSBT members199 have caused
few problems to date, but this may change if a formal management
procedure—in other words, a formulaic rule for deriving automatic
adjustments to the TAC and national allocations from new scientific
information—is adopted. This troubled participants at an early workshop
meeting called to devise such a rule, who noted that any TAC change
required by a given management procedure would most likely apply to
quota years and therefore be implemented at slightly different times by
different members.200 As the CCSBT's annual meeting, where the
relevant decision would be made, has in recent years normally taken
place in October, 201 this would make it impossible for a member whose
quota year starts any earlier to implement the change for up to twelve
months. This, in turn, would create a time lag of two years between the
year in which the date on which the management procedure relies are
generated and the implementation of any consequential TAC change.
The CCSBT would therefore need to discuss and specify the quota year
in which a TAC change arising from the management procedure would
be implemented for each member.202
199. CCSBT, Report of the Fourth Meeting of the Management Procedure Workshop,
Attachment 6 (May 16-21, 2005) [hereinafter CCSBT-MPW4 Report], available at
www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/meeting_reports/ccsbt_12/report_of_MPWS4.pdf (listing the
quota years). Only Taiwan and the Philippines use the calendar year, whereas Australia’s
quota year runs from Dec. 1 to the following Nov. 30, Japan’s and Korea’s run from
March 1 to the end of the following February, and New Zealand’s runs from Oct. 1 to the
following Sept. 30. Id.
200. CCSBT, Report of the Second Meeting of the Management Procedure Workshop,
Attachment E, app. 6 at 26 [hereinafter CCBST-MPW2 Report], available at
www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/meeting_reports/ccsbt_10/report_of_mpws2.pdf.
201. Article 6(3) of the 1993 Convention actually names August as the default month
for annual meetings, suggesting a tacit understanding among its drafters that the national
allocations apply to the next fishing season of each member, whenever it may start.
202. CCBST-MPW2 Report, supra note 200, Attachment E, app. 6. Note that the
staggering of fishing seasons could also complicate any superimposition of quota trading.
To avoid conservation consequences at the margin, it would seem that any system in
which the members are left to their own devices in transferring quota to each other would
either need to align members’ fishing seasons or, in the alternative, introduce a restriction
that transfers can only take place from a relinquishing member to a gaining member
whose season ends at the same time as, or later than, that of the relinquishing member.
Such a restriction seems undesirable because over time it would result in trading pushing
allocations artificially from members with early-starting fishing seasons to those whose
seasons finish later, even though the timing of season dates is in this context essentially
an arbitrary factor. In the CCSBT, for example, it would mean that New Zealand (whose
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Any alignment of seasons will also require compensating allocations
or deductions for the longer or shorter transitional season. Depending on
the pattern of catch through the year, it may not necessarily be
appropriate to equate a one-month adjustment with one twelfth of either
the previous national allocation, or the new one, if changed. This
complication could be avoided, however, by making the alignment in a
year when the TAC does not change.203 While there can be no objection
on conservation grounds to extending the duration of a season longer
than twelve months, shortening of the season can lead to abuse if it
occurs in a situation where the full quota has been taken in less than 365
days and the early closure leads to a new season opening the next day
with a fresh quota.204 Australia has had two SBT seasons of thirteen
months or more and one season of eleven-and-a-half months. The short
season was preceded two years earlier by a thirteen-and-a-half-month
one, however, so that the three seasons together lasted thirty-seven
months; this may explain why no other member objected to it.205
H. Control of Fishing by Nationals
Because at international law States’ jurisdiction over their nationals
applies equally to natural and legal persons and vessels, the fact that
some nationals of fishery commission member States use vessels flagged
to non-members creates a further perception of unfair advantage. Here

season starts and finishes earlier than any other member’s) could never purchase quota,
only sell it. The scientists developing the CCSBT’s management procedure seem to have
come to a similar conclusion for automatic adjustments under the procedure in the TAC
and national allocations (pari passu or not). CCSBT-MPW4 Report, supra note 199, at
24, ¶ 100.
203. On the other hand, a State that wished to make a one-off contribution to the
biomass without jeopardizing its initial share could elect to forgo compensation for a
transitional year longer than twelve months. Human psychology being what it is,
members whose seasons start early could help make the process easier by not objecting to
a late starting date for the new uniform season that will avoid any member having a
transitional season of less than 12 months.
204. For an egregious example of this in the groundfish fishery on the Atlantic coast of
the United States in the 1970s, see J.L. McHugh, The Jeffersonian Democracy and
Fisheries Revisited, in GLOBAL FISHERIES: PERSPECTIVES FOR THE 1980S 73, 89 (B.J.
Rothschild ed., Springer-Verlag 1983).
205. Australia’s SBT fishing years ran from Oct. 1 to the following Sept. 30 in 198890; Oct. 1, 1991, to Oct. 31, 1992; Nov. 1 to the following Oct. 31 in 1992 and 1993;
Nov. 1, 1994, to Dec. 15, 1995; Dec. 16, 1995, to Dec. 15, 1996; Dec. 16, 1996, to Nov.
30, 1997; and since 1997 from Dec. 1 to the following Nov. 30. CCBST-EC6 Report,
supra note 104, Attachment 8-1, app. 1, at 15.
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again, the experience of the CCSBT is instructive. In 1998, New
Zealand raised reports that Japanese interests had chartered bunkering
vessels that were also used by fishing vessels flagged to non-members of
the CCSBT, that Japan provided a market for non-member catch, and
that there was considerable investment by Japanese interests in nonmember SBT fishing operations.206 New Zealand advised that it had
procedures in place to prevent New Zealand interests from entering into
charter or joint fishing arrangements for SBT with non-members, but
was not aware of any bunkering of non-member vessels fishing for SBT
or any investment by New Zealand nationals in non-member SBT fishing
operations.207 Australia, too, stated that it had similar restrictions
preventing joint ventures with, and access to its ports by, vessels from
States fishing for SBT outside the 1993 Convention regime.208 Japan
admitted that its nationals were working as crew on non-member vessels
and had issued a non-binding directive (which for constitutional reasons
could not be binding) advising them to cease this practice.209 Japan
confirmed that it maintained no restrictions on the import of SBT and
that it had a system for regulating investment by Japanese in nonmember SBT fishing operations.210
In recent years, the focus of attention has shifted to catch of SBT
taken in Indonesian waters by vessels owned by Taiwanese interests but
flagged to Indonesia, allowing Taiwan to maintain that their catch should
be considered Indonesian. This came about as a result of the Trade
Information Scheme adopted by the CCSBT at its Sixth Meeting in 1999,
set to come into operation on June 1, 2000,211 which highlighted a link
between Indonesian and Taiwanese fishing through the recording of over
1800 tonnes of SBT imports into Japan from Taiwan despite Taiwan’s
206. CCSBT, Report of the Fourth Annual Meeting at 2 (Jan. 19-22, 1998), available
at http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/meeting_reports/ccsbt_4/report_of_ccsbt4_part2.pdf.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. CCSBT6(1) Report, supra note 169, at 3, ¶ 18. The full details of the scheme are
set out in “CCSBT Southern Bluefin Tuna Statistical Document Program” (Attachment
M to the report), but some of the text is square-bracketed, indicating that the points
concerned were left by the members to subsequent negotiation. When the meeting
resumed some months later, the Executive Secretary advised that, since the adjournment,
the details of the scheme had been sent to those non-members identified by Japan as
having exported SBT to it within the last five years as well as to other international
fishery commissions. A finalized version of the scheme was then adopted. CCSBT6(2)
Report, supra note 68, at 4, ¶ 21. The full specification of the scheme is in “CCSBT
Southern Bluefin Tuna Statistical Document Program” (Attachment J to the report).
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voluntary restraint of its catch to 1450 tonnes. Taiwan appears to have
initially accepted responsibility for the catch of Taiwan-owned vessels
fishing in Indonesian waters in declaring (despite its policy of restricting
its catch to 1450 tonnes) catches for 1999 and 2000 of 1787 tonnes and
1689 tonnes, respectively,212 before reclassifying them as unregulated
Indonesian catch the following year.213 The meeting repeated the
previous year’s concern that Taiwanese vessels were catching SBT under
flags of convenience and at Taiwan’s “apparent inability to exert any
control over these vessels, or to provide information concerning the
number of vessels, or the flags that they flew.”214 Japan urged Taiwan to
follow its example by making it illegal for its citizens to target SBT
using a flag-of-convenience vessel.215
Taiwanese vessels fishing in Indonesian waters would have been
unproblematic had Indonesia by then—rather than in 2008—become a
member and had the Taiwanese vessels in fact been fishing against
Indonesian quota. As it was, Taiwan had both the power and the duty to
control this catch, considering that, through Taiwan’s membership in the
Extended Commission, it had given a “firm commitment to respect”
Article 15, paragraph 4 of the 1993 Convention.216 Although the
beneficial ownership of fishing vessels is often deliberately kept obscure,
ideally all catch of SBT by vessels owned or controlled by nationals of
CCSBT members should be brought into their mutual accounting.
IV. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CCSBT’S STOCK STATUS
TARGET AND THE MAXIMUM SUSTAINABLE YIELD STANDARD IN
UNCLOS
State responsibility also has a crucial role to play in ensuring that the
members of a fisheries commission do not collectively abandon their

212. CCSBT7 Report, supra note 105, Attachment F-5, at 1.
213. The 1999 and 2000 catches have been reduced to 1513 and 1638 tonnes,
respectively. CCSBT8 Report, supra note 66, Attachment K-5, at 1. Taiwan agreed to
investigate this catch further, and at the following (Eighth) Meeting of the CCSBT
Taiwan advised that the vessels operating in Indonesian waters were in fact flagged to
Indonesia; hence Taiwan considered their catch as Indonesian. See CCSBT7 Report,
supra note 105, ¶¶ 33-36. See also CCSBT8 Report, supra note 66, at 6, ¶ 39. The SBT
catches by the Philippines and the Seychelles detected by the scheme were also thought
to be by Taiwanese-owned vessels operating under flags of convenience. Id. ¶ 90, at 13.
See also ICCAT Green Book 2000/1, supra note 182, at 133.
214. CCSBT8 Report, supra note 66, at 13, ¶ 91.
215. Id.
216. CCSBT7 Report, supra note 105, Attachment I, ¶ 6.
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conservation obligations, not to each other (for voluntary abandonment
inter se would seem to be legally unobjectionable), but to other States
potentially interested in entering the fishery in the future. The CCSBT,
however, is in danger of doing just that, as a consequence of its special
meeting in 2004, at which all members agreed that the former
management objective of restoring the parental stock to its 1980 biomass
(B1980) by 2020 was not feasible.
It should be noted that the abandoned B1980 by 2020 objective was
not set with reference to Bmsy; the 1980 level was simply one that, up to
then, seemed high enough to avoid any adverse effect on recruitment.217
Hence, even if this goal had been met, it would not be safe to say that
there would be no need to rebuild the stock any further.218 Nor would the
CCSBT thereby have satisfied the target set in 2002 at the World Summit
on Sustainable Development: that action was required to “[m]aintain or
restore stocks to levels that can produce the maximum sustainable yield
with the aim of achieving these goals for depleted stocks on an urgent
basis and where possible not later than 2015.”219 It is now all but
inevitable that members will have the uncomfortable task of explaining
to a future such gathering why this was not possible for SBT.
Even before its abandonment, however, there was no concerted effort
to meet the goal. The Chair of the Scientific Committee advised the
Eighth Meeting of the CCSBT that the 2000 catch level of 15,579 tonnes
appeared to be “roughly close to the replacement yield, with a 50%
chance that the stock could either decrease or increase at this harvest
level.”220 While no effort had yet been made to estimate the harvest level
217. Transcript of Record, Public Sitting of the International Tribunal for the Law of
the Sea at 16, Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (N.Z. v. Japan; Austl. v. Japan)
ITLOS/PV.99/22/Rev.2 (Aug. 19, 1999), available at http://www.itlos.org/
case_documents/2001/document_en_141.pdf.
218. This is comparable to the use by the International Council for the Exploration of
the Sea, from which the European Community obtains its fisheries science advice, of
impaired recruitment as a limit (danger) reference point, which is perceived as less
precautionary than NAFO’s use of MSY. O.S. Stokke & C. Coffey, Precaution, ICES
and the Common Fisheries Policy: A Study of Regime Interplay, 28 MARINE POLICY 117,
120 (2004). On the adoption of MSY in NAFO, see S.M. Garcia, The Precautionary
Approach to Fisheries: Progress Review and Main Issues (1995-2000), in CURRENT
FISHERIES ISSUES AND THE FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED
NATIONS 479, 493-95 (M.H. Nordquist & J. Norton Moore eds., Martinus Nijhoff 2000).
219. World Summit on Sustainable Development [WSSD], Johannesburg, South
Africa, Aug. 26-Sept. 4, 2002, Report of the World Summit on Sustainable Development,
Annex at ¶ 31(a), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.199/20 (2002) [hereinafter WSSD Plan of
Implementation].
220. CCSBT8 Report, supra note 66, at 7, ¶ 43.
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required to achieve recovery of the parental stock to its 1980 level by
2020, most of the assessment results indicated low probability of
attaining this target at that catch level.221 Yet New Zealand found no
support when it stated, in reasoning that cannot be faulted, that “[t]he
logical and responsible conclusion we draw from this is that catch levels
must be reduced in order to achieve our stated management
objectives.”222
Modeling was carried out some years ago to estimate the likelihood
of returning the SBT stock to Bmsy by 2020 under a number of
management strategies if removals were reduced in the short term. The
significance of these is that the more successful models show average
removals over the period to 2020 exceeding present removals, suggesting
that the MSY itself would be over 20,000 tonnes per annum.223 For the
CCSBT to adopt a management strategy that delays or prevents recovery
of the stock to Bmsy is therefore, it is submitted, to deny all potential new
entrants’ rights to share in the benefit that such a recovery would bring.
This, however, is precisely what it seems to be doing, judging from
the debate on the management strategy in 2003 and 2004. When it
began, only New Zealand said that any alternative objective to B1980 by
2020 must be consistent with the 1993 Convention and the wider
international legal regime, and even it qualified this, stating that until
there was an agreed management procedure to guide members toward the
new objective, the current one should stay.224 Because of the state of the
stock, it preferred a cautious procedure over an aggressive policy, but
viewed TAC changes every three years as suitable.225 Australia
considered that the current objective should be replaced by an achievable
one that resulted in “some rebuilding” of the stock––this could, but need
not, be Bmsy.226 Taiwan, too, believed that the current objective could not
be reached and agreed in principle to its revision, but did not say how
beyond favoring gradual changes in TAC at five-year intervals.227 Japan
considered that the current “very strict” objective was not achievable,
and that Bmsy would be more appropriate, but the period for achieving it
221. Id.
222. Id. at Attachment N-4.
223. T. Polacheck, N.L. Klaer, C. Millar & A.L. Preece, An Initial Evaluation of
Management Strategies for the Southern Bluefin Tuna Fishery, 56 ICES JOURNAL OF
MARINE SCIENCE 811, 819 (1999). Care should be taken, however, as this assumes the
catch statistics on which the modellers relied were accurate. Id. at 816.
224. CCSBT-EC2 Report, supra note 66, Attachment 4-4 at 2-3. See also id. at 8, ¶ 46.
225. Id. at 7, ¶ 46.
226. Id.
227. Id.
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could be decided “once more data become available.”228 Japan also
wanted to “explore more moderate policies” with biomass at 100% and
110% of the much smaller 2002 level.229 Korea, “from an administrative
perspective,” said it would be best for the fishery to be highly productive
and managed with an aggressive catch policy “so that a future increase in
stock, if any, would be retained by members, without giving an incentive
to non-members.”230
At the 2004 Special Meeting, Australia and New Zealand both
required an objective that would result in rebuilding of the stock—
already an essential component of the then current management
objective—but New Zealand was alone in drawing attention to how
members’ wider international obligations might constrain their choice of
a new one.231 Taiwan preferred only gradual TAC reductions in the short
term and would have been satisfied with a management objective of a
spawning stock biomass only 90% of that in 2002 (B2002).232 Japan
wanted an objective based on Bmsy, while Korea could support either Bmsy
or B2002 as the objective.233 The management procedure ultimately
adopted aims at a probability of 50% that the parental biomass in 2014
will be smaller than that of 2004, which was its lowest yet recorded, and
a 10% chance that by 2022 this biomass will be below that of 2004.234
228. Id. Note that if Japan is saying that Bmsy by 2020 would be less strict than B1980
by 2020, there is a contradiction in its position unless either B1980 is greater than Bmsy
or Japan was not advocating reaching Bmsy until long after 2020; the former is very
unlikely.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 8, ¶ 46. The Korean attitude is a straightforward manifestation of the
disastrous but rational reasoning engendered under the “tragedy of the commons”
affecting high seas fisheries; with open access, all players have an incentive to maximize
their own catch irrespective of the damage they do to the stock (and of their knowledge of
that damage) because, as H.S. Gordon put it in his pioneering article on fisheries
economics, “the fish in the sea are valueless to the fisherman, because there is no
assurance that they will be there for him tomorrow if they are left behind today.” H.S.
Gordon, Economic Theory of a Common Property Resource: The Fishery, 62 JOURNAL
OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 124, 135 (1954).
231. CCSBT, Report of the Special Meeting of the Extended Commission at 4, ¶ 13
(2004)
[hereinafter
CCSBTSM4
Report],
available
at
www.ccsbt.org/
docs/pdf/meeting_reports/ccsbt_11/report_of_special_meeting.pdf.
See also id.,
Attachment 4-4 at 2 (detailing the argument by New Zealand that any objective that does
not rebuild the stock “would be contrary to the [1993] Convention and our international
obligations,” although there was “flexibility around the timeframe for achieving
rebuilding”).
232. Id. at 5, ¶ 13.
233. Id.
234. CCSBT-ESC4 Report, supra note 87, at 8, ¶¶ 37-38, 9, ¶ 45.
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The proposed upper and lower bounds of parental biomass in 2022 of 1.5
and 0.7 times B2002 were accepted, although a lower bound of 0.8 or 0.9
might be preferred, and emphasis was laid on exploring procedures
around the “moderate level” of 1.1 as a coefficient (that is, aiming for the
stock in 2022 to be only 10% larger than its depleted state of 2002).235 In
settling on these parameters, members appear to have been taking their
cue from the views of industry representatives consulted during the
CCSBT’s development of a management procedure, some preferring to
aim to rebuild the stock to its 2002 level, others favoring merely
arresting its decline, but none calling for rebuilding to Bmsy.236
In other words, even if the catch figures that the CCSBT had been
using up to 2006 had been accurate and the 2004 management procedure
had been fully implemented, it is not clear when, if ever, the stock would
have been rebuilt to Bmsy, as Article 5 of Annex II to the U.N. Fish Stocks
Agreement and (subject to economic and environmental factors) Article
119, paragraph 1(a) of UNCLOS both require.
This should not be surprising; the economics of fishing produce a
paradigm shift when the Bmsy barrier is breached, so that operators will
resist the injunction to restrict catches in order to rebuild the stock to
Bmsy from below. An example of the trouble this causes is an unreported
judgment of the New Zealand High Court in a case where evidence had
been led that in the New Zealand snapper fishery a yield of 92% of MSY
was being produced by a biomass that was only 50% of Bmsy. The Court
held that the Minister of Fisheries had discretion as to the pace at which
to rebuild to Bmsy, but not about whether to do so at all.237 While Burke’s
criticism that this will lead to greater risk of depletion is hard to
understand, the case does illustrate the economic point that a fishery in
this position would need a substantial drop from the current level of
catch in order to rebuild the stock to Bmsy, but participants would not be
rewarded by much more catch in the future. Even a low discount rate
might not justify this in cost-benefit terms, though a reduction in
unnecessary effort might. The discount rate of SBT, however, is very
high. This is illustrated by the aborted CCSBT management procedure:
in 2005, a cut in the TAC for 2006 of 5000 tonnes (which was to have
been the first step in a management procedure aimed at reaching a
particular stock size by 2014) was delayed by a year. Still wanting to
235. CCSBT-EC2 Report, supra note 66, at 8, ¶ 52.
236. See CCSBT-MPW2 Report, supra note 200, Attachment G, ¶7.
237. William T. Burke, Evolution in the Fishery Provisions of UNCLOS, LIBER
AMICORUM JUDGE SHIGERU ODA Vol. 2 1355, 1356-59 (N. Ando, E. McWhinney & R.
Wolfrum, eds., Kluwer Law Int’l 2002).
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meet that goal, the members accepted the Scientific Committee’s advice
that the delayed cut would instead have to be 7160 tonnes.238 In other
words, 5000 tonnes “borrowed” from the stock for a year and then repaid
over eight years would result in a total repayment of 8 x (7160 – 5000) =
17,280 tonnes.239
The fisheries economics literature predicts as much: if, as is typically
the case, vessels and labor cannot be immediately redeployed elsewhere,
the appropriate policy is not to close the depleted fishery altogether––
which would be the quickest way to reach Bmsy––but to rebuild the stock
gradually.240 Since a stock that is depleted can still be fished sustainably
(albeit at a yield far below MSY) it can still generate worthwhile
economic returns. That it may be more profitable to continue to fish a
depleted stock at that low yield than to try to rebuild it is evidenced by
the $A300,000 per tonne being fetched by Australian SBT quota in mid2002.241 Because this figure represents the present value of 1/5265th
share into the indefinite future of whatever catch limit Australian
authorities impose, anyone willing to pay this price must have thought
the fishery’s economic prospects bright, all the more so with the lower
price being fetched on the glutted Japanese market at the time.242

238. See CCSBT-EC4 Report, supra note 64, ¶¶ 47-66 (discussing TAC).
239. Obviously, the total tonnage repaid would be far closer to the 5000 tonnes
borrowed if the repayment occurred over one or two years, but the very fact that members
regarded this as worthwhile is a worrying indicator of just how high their implied
discount rate is (in other words, how much less subjectively valuable for them the
prospect of a tonne of SBT caught in a year’s or ten years’ time is than a tonne caught
today), and thus how strong the desire to resist rebuilding the stock to Bmsy—UNCLOS
Article 119 and Annex II to the U.N. Fish Stocks Agreement notwithstanding—can be
expected to remain. In fact, the implied discount rate, assuming net returns of a fixed
price per tonne of SBT in 2005 dollars, is no less than 40.326% per annum. See
MoneyMadeClear
Loan
Calculator,
http://www.moneymadeclear.fsa.gov.uk/
tools.aspx?Tool=loan_calculator (last visited Oct. 9, 2009) (obtaining the result by filling
in the first, second, and fourth boxes with 5000, 8, and 1, respectively, and manipulating
the figure in the third (interest rate) box in order for the result displayed in the fifth
(annual repayment) box to be exactly 2160).
240. G.R. Munro & A.D. Scott, The Economics of Fisheries Management, in
HANDBOOK OF NATURAL RESOURCE AND ENERGY ECONOMICS, Vol. II, 623, 651 (Allen V.
Kneese & James L. Sweeney, eds., North-Holland, Amsterdam 1985).
241. Andrew Serdy, One Fin, Two Fins, Red Fins, Bluefins: Some Problems of
Taxonomy and Nomenclature Affecting Legal Instruments Governing Tunas and Other
Highly Migratory Species, 28 MARINE POLICY 235, 242 n.26 (2004).
242. See CCSBT-EC2 Report, supra note 66, Attachment 11 (referring to the “current
depressed market in Japan”). Note, though, that there is no reason to think that quota as
an asset would be less prone to speculative bubbles than, say, shares.
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Against this economically unpromising backdrop, the precautionary
approach to fisheries in Annex II to the UN Fish Stocks Agreement is
less likely to succeed as a means of reversing depletion than it is in
preventing it in the first place for stocks not overfished. Although setting
Bmsy as the limit reference point serves unexploited and lightly or
moderately exploited stocks (i.e. those that are above Bmsy) well, left to
their own devices, as the CCSBT’s attitude shows, those exploiting a
stock already driven below Bmsy will have insufficient economic
incentive to rebuild the stock at all, to the detriment of those States that
could reasonably hope to profit from access to a healthier, rebuilt
stock.243 From this perspective, it matters little whether Bmsy shifts to
being a limit reference point under the precautionary approach from its
role as a target reference point under UNCLOS (in U.N. Fish Stocks
Agreement Annex II terms); this will only become relevant after the
stock has recovered. Even recovery to Bmsy would be a major advance
for SBT, so that for the foreseeable future it will be enough for the
CCSBT to set its management compass by UNCLOS alone.
Evidently, then, something more is needed to bring the legal and
economic incentives for depleted stocks into alignment, and it is
suggested that willingness to invoke State responsibility is the missing
element. The news from the biological front is better; the starting point
here is that, grim though the current state of the SBT stock is, precedents
from other comparable fisheries indicate that recovery is possible.
Pacific halibut, for example, is similar in longevity and late maturity to
SBT,244 yet was brought back from severe depletion: “[a] fishery which

243. The Western ABT stock is another example of this phenomenon: with the
spawning stock biomass estimated in 1996 to be 13% of Bmsy, Panel 2 of ICCAT was
informed that an annual catch of around 2500 tonnes would roughly double it in twenty
years, but to get to Bmsy in twenty years would require a drastic reduction in catch to 500
tonnes per annum. ICCAT Green Book 1997/1, supra note 102, at 112, ¶ 5.b.2. Despite
this, Japan proposed raising the TAC to 2500 tonnes from its then current 2200 tonnes,
id. at 113, ¶ 6.b.3, a course of action adopted first by the panel, id. at 114, ¶ 6.b.17, and
then by ICCAT itself., id. at 47, ¶13.4. Although a twenty-year rebuilding program was
adopted in 1998 (with a twenty-year TAC unless amended), ICCAT Green Book 1999/1,
supra note 102, at 67, at the first signs of recovery in 2000 Canada and the U.S. wanted
the TAC held at 2500 tonnes, whereas Japan argued for an increase to 3000 tonnes even
though only two out of four assessments showed that this was sustainable, ICCAT Green
Book 2001/1, supra note 102, at 213-15. In 2007, the TAC had to be reduced to 2100
tonnes. ICCAT Green Book 2007/1, supra note 9, at 144, ¶ 3.
244. In this species, individuals older than twenty are common; females mature from
age eight to sixteen with a mean of twelve and are much more susceptible to overfishing
than males, which mature between the ages of five and eleven (at nine on average). H.A.
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had been disastrously depleted by unrestricted fishing has been so
restored as to be one of the best stabilized and most profitable to its
fishermen.”245 Although doubts raised by some on this score246 seem
vindicated by the subsequent severe shortening of the fishing season and
economic waste associated with the open access fishery for this species,
it does not follow that one should deny the recovery was worth bringing
about, even if it could have been done better.
On this basis, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the members of
the CCSBT are in collective breach of their conservation obligations
under customary international law and UNCLOS Article 119 to other
States that could profitably fish a rebuilt stock at Bmsy. But the CCSBT is
surely not unique in this; a similar analysis performed for other stocks
managed by other commissions would no doubt come to the same
conclusion for a good number of them, possibly with the eastern Atlantic
and Mediterranean stock of Atlantic bluefin tuna at the top of the list.
The international fisheries law community made a bad start in
implicitly treating quantified catch limits as obligations de conduite.
This was much less conducive to the success of international fisheries
management than if they were obligations de résultat, because fish
caught in excess of a catch limit are lost to the stock even if the
overcatch is in legal terms excusable. If this leads to overcatch being
repeatedly ignored, with no downward adjustments made to future catch
limits, then the stock will be vulnerable to depletion over time.
Thus, the question that commissions should ask when faced with
overcatch is not whether a State has behaved in a way that merits some
sort of compensatory adjustment being levied against it, but rather
who—the overcatching State or the members as a whole—should bear
the loss when one of their number exceeds its quota, excusably or
otherwise.
With State practice through fisheries commissions’
compliance committees now at least appearing to accept that quantified
catch limits are obligations de résultat, a revived role for State
responsibility may become a realistic possibility. If all are accountable
to each other thanks to their right to fish on the high seas, then the
freedom of fishing in UNCLOS Article 116, as well as being the cause of
the problem, paradoxically becomes part of the solution. The creation of

Dunlop, Management of the Halibut Fishery of the Northeastern Pacific Ocean and
Bering Sea, 222, 226-27, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.10/7 (1956).
245. Id. at 223. It is not clear, however, where in relation to Bmsy the stock stood at its
nadir.
246. MYRES S. MCDOUGAL & WILLIAM T. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS:
A CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 482 (1962).
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a legal pecking order for access to stocks is not, by itself, where the
matter ends. Because it means that those States at the bottom face the
risk of being left with nothing, a duty is thereby imposed on those higher
up to manage the fishery in a way that maximizes the likelihood that
something will be left over for those below. At present, this is perhaps
best expressed as those States at the top having to fish conservatively in
accordance with the precautionary approach to fisheries in Annex II to
the U.N. Fish Stocks Agreement. The paucity of State practice may
stand in the way of a conclusion reached along classical lines that this
has entered the corpus of custom, but the ultimate practical effect may be
the same where, as here, an identical conclusion can be derived from the
duty of cooperation (whose customary status is not doubted).
V. FINAL WORD: STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND A THEORY OF
EVERYTHING?
If the success of fisheries commissions is gauged by the health of the
stock(s) under their management, the CCSBT and its members cannot be
said to have succeeded in overcoming the problems of the past.
Indonesia’s eventual accession to the U.N. Fish Stocks Agreement, if it
occurs, will help in the CCSBT, but more than anything else, what is
required is to create real, dissuasive consequences for those who do not
comply with conservation obligations, in the form of the delinquent
State’s secondary obligation to restore the stock to the position it would
have been in had that State originally complied. The dispute settlement
provisions of the U.N. Fish Stocks Agreement make an approach based
on revival of State responsibility more realistic, whether or not an
aggrieved State actually resorts to them.
Indeed, increased attention to State responsibility has other potential
benefits for the management of international fisheries.247 It makes
247. The variety of possible uses for invocation of State responsibility is considerable.
With a modicum of imagination, the CCSBT could have used such a strategy as a way
out of the 2002 impasse caused by Japan’s insistence that there were 1000 tonnes of spare
quota—its trade statistics suggested that Indonesia’s catch was around this much less than
the figures used by the scientists—of which 500 tonnes should be redistributed to existing
members and the rest retained for stock recovery. CCSBT8 Report, supra note 66,
Attachment N-2. Instead of resisting Japan’s call, Australia and New Zealand could have
invited Japan to assume international responsibility for Indonesia’s catch as well as its
own, and on that basis could have consented to a combined quota for Japan and Indonesia
of around 7000 tonnes. True, Japan would have been wise to decline such an offer, given
that its confidence was soon proven misplaced, CCSBT-ESC4 Report, supra note 87,
Attachment 4. Yet this could only have come at the cost of being seen to lack the
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accounting properly for catch all the more crucial. There are two issues
here: defining and adhering to catch limits. As to the former, irrespective
of whether quota trading hereafter becomes a reality in the CCSBT and
other fishery commissions, it is clear that when such bodies set TACs, in
order to guarantee that “total” means just that, they must ensure that it is
clear whether their quota allocations cover only commercial catch or all
sources of catch: bycatch, scientific research catch, and recreational
catch. On the latter, the disastrous effect of misreporting catch not only
for the fishery but also for the science that supports it was made clear in
2006 when, just as the CCSBT’s painstakingly developed management
procedure was about to be implemented, the Japanese catch figures on
which it was partly based were exposed as grossly understated. The
Chair of the Scientific Committee advised that implementation could not
proceed, as the revelations had raised major uncertainties about the
operating model, such as how much additional fishing effort had been
expended to make the newly admitted catch.248 Resolving these
questions is likely to take several years,249 with substantial investment by
the CCSBT—efforts put in by the working group convened for this
purpose from 2000 through a series of resource-intensive workshops, the
engagement of a number of outside consultants as an Advisory Panel,
culminating in a Special Meeting of the Commission,250 and the choice of
a management procedure from among the ones offered by the Scientific
Committee251—in the interim set at naught.
Because past understatement of catches and profits will serve to
diminish the compensation available, raising the profile of State
responsibility in fisheries should become a factor dissuading States from
concealing the full extent of their fishing activity. Concern to limit
potential compensation could also be a far-reaching way to integrate the

courage of its convictions. Had it accepted, the responsibility for remedying the
combined overcatch would have fallen entirely on Japan.
248. See e.g. CCSBT, Report of the Seventh Meeting of the Stock Assessment Group, at
¶¶ 43-57 (2006), available at http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/meeting_reports/
ccsbt_13/report_of_SAG7.pdf.
249. The timeframe for adoption, even of an interim management procedure, would be
three to five years. CCSBT-EC5 Report, supra note 99, at 8, ¶ 46.
250. See CCSBT, Report of the First Meeting of the Management Procedure Workshop
(March 3-4 and 6-8, 2002), available at http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/meeting_reports/ccsbt_9/
report_of_mpws1.pdf; CCSBT-MPW2 Report, supra note 200; CCSBT, Report of the Third
Meeting of the Management Procedure Workshop (2004), available at http://www.ccsbt.org/
docs/pdf/meeting_reports/ccsbt_11/Report_of_mpws3.pdf; CCSBT-MPW4 Report, supra note
199; CCSBTSM4 Report, supra note 231, app. 3.
251. CCSBT-EC3 Report, supra note 66, at 8, ¶ 51.
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work on disciplines on fishery subsidies in the World Trade
Organization’s Doha Round252 into the broader international fisheries law
framework. Because compensation at the international level is payable
to States and not to the individual vessels or persons of their nationality
who have suffered the loss, a State faced with a claim for compensation
would naturally be inclined to insist as to quantum that the gross losses
of those individuals be discounted for any subsidies, which do not
represent a loss to the subsidizing State.
Considerations of this kind suggest that States ought not to be able to
limit their liability even inter se by according themselves high quotas in
commissions. To the extent that a quota binds other members of the
commission, quotas that are part of a TAC that is in biological terms too
high leave members with no legal recourse against States that fish within
those quotas, and limit the compensation payable if the quotas are
exceeded. Here, too, the role of outsiders is crucial, as collectively the
members have chosen to bear the risks associated with a dangerously
high TAC, but will remain collectively responsible to them, if not to each
other, even without any member exceeding its catch limit. Accordingly,
it should be provided that quota decisions are not to be taken as a
voluntary assumption of risk by those members objecting to it as too high
and not subsequently exceeding their own quotas under it, or those
voting against it for this reason where there is no objection procedure. In
this way, the revival of State responsibility will give States an incentive
to move away from lowest common denominator decision-making
procedures and promote efficacious alternatives in the fisheries
commissions of which they are members.
If the aim is to overcome the tragedy of the commons besetting high
seas fisheries, it is hard to disagree with the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development’s advocacy of indirect enforcement by
holding flag States accountable for the actions of their vessels and
nationals, with quota or trade sanctions for non-compliance253—in other
252. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002). In the WSSD Plan of Implementation,
subparagraph 31(f) notes the necessity to “[e]liminate subsidies that contribute to illegal,
unreported, and unregulated fishing and to over-capacity, while completing the efforts
undertaken at WTO to clarify and improve its disciplines on fisheries subsidies.” WSSD
Plan of Implementation, supra note 219.
253. Geen et al., supra note 181, at 158. See also Veijo Kaitala & Gordon R. Munro,
The Management of High Seas Fisheries, 8 MARINE RESOURCE ECONOMICS 313, 325-26
(1993) (noting that, without some mechanism of this kind, even a successful stockrebuilding program will remain vulnerable to a breakdown in cooperation caused by the
shift of bargaining power in high-cost harvesters’ favor as the health of a stock is
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words, to reinstate State responsibility into international fisheries law.
Should quota trading become more widely practiced, this would require
that the effect of purchasing quota should be that the transferee
member’s responsibility for reporting and compliance should be the
same as if it had originally been allocated the entire amount by the
commission. Considering the potential complexity of any accounting
mechanisms,254 it would also be sensible to have some subsidiary means
for enforcement of quotas. For example, members of the now defunct
International Baltic Sea Fisheries Commission were permitted to refuse
landings of quota species from vessels flagged to States whose quota was
exhausted.255
Clearly, the matters set out in these last pages require a great deal
more elaboration on the part of interested States and scholars in the years
ahead (including building on the ILC Draft Articles on State
Responsibility) before they can take their place in the developing
international fisheries law landscape. For such an all-embracing “theory
of everything” to emerge, however, it should be apparent that the role of
new entrants — as potential participants in a high seas fishery for a stock
like SBT keen to ensure that their rights are not infringed, by quota
trading or otherwise — will approach in importance that of the actual
participants to date as they attempt to capture the benefits of the fishery
for themselves.

restored; because of its objection procedure, this description is not met by NAFO (and
presumably every other fisheries commission with a similar procedure)).
254. Despite addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division being the only
mathematical operations used, the opacity of the tables in ICCAT reports make it difficult
to see how catch limits worked out in this way are derived. See, e.g., ICCAT Green Book
2006/1, supra note 51, at 220-29. The problems that might arise under an excessively
complicated accounting system are illustrated by Canada’s erroneous interpretation of an
earlier measure. ICCAT Green Book 2000/1, supra note 182, Annex 5-2, at 70 (taking
paragraph 3(c) to mean that Canada could carry over only 10% rather than all of its
unused dead discard quota; the reference to 10% was in fact Canada’s share of the TAC).
Canada did not subsequently reclaim the inadvertently forgone 90%. In a later “National
Report of Canada,” there are useful worked examples in prose of how overage and
unused discard quotas carried forward to subsequent years in ABT and swordfish work.
ICCAT Green Book 2004/3, supra note 188, at 11.
255. Geen et al., supra note 181, at 154. This Commission ceased to exist at the
beginning of 2007 after all its members but the Russian Federation joined the latter. See
European Commission, About the Common Fisheries Policy, The International Baltic Sea
Fisheries Commission (IBSFC), http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/external_relations/rfos/
ibsfc_en.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2009).

